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Introduction 
 
Theory 
 
 One of the most notable developments in American Constitutional 
Jurisprudence in the past century is the growth of in the scope and breadth of Free 
Speech theory and doctrine. One of the key frameworks within this debate has been 
the “Mof Ideas”, first introduced by Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes in his dissent in 
Ambras v. United States. This perspective views free speech as a necessary tool in the 
creation of an effective public debate that is necessary for the pursuit of “the truth”. 
By operationalizing speech, however, this perspective ignores the democratizing 
aspects of free speech that make it “the indispensable condition of nearly every 
other form of freedom,”1 as it is only through free expression that individuals are 
able to exert any control and agency over the political decisions that affect their 
lives. Furthermore, by creating “truth” as the meaning of free speech, the 
Marketplace framework opens up the possibility of political censorship in the name 
of maintaining the integrity of the Marketplace itself. This establishes the idea that 
certain ideologies, and the people that hold them, are “outside” the realm of 
acceptable Democratic politics. While they still have access to institutional means of 
influence like voting, their ideologies are so dangerous or otherwise counter-
productive that permitting them a place in the marketplace would threaten the state 
that undergirds that marketplace. In this way, the censored individuals will be 
                                                        
1 Gillman, Howard, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of State Power 
and the Rise of Modern Civil Rights Jurisprudence, 645 
 6 
forced to pick from choices completely separate from their own political desires. In 
short, they are obedient to the desires of the uncensored majority. 2  
 With this in mind, I hypothesize that by removing specific ideological groups 
from the democratic process, restrictions on speech isolates and radicalizes these 
targeted groups. Conversely, by promoting the removal of these groups from the 
Democratic process, I hypothesize that censoring political speech causes those who 
promote speech censorship to develop a stratified view of Democracy wherein 
certain individuals are permitted to influence public discourse and others, due to 
the content of their ideas, are not which ultimately undermines the equal access 
Democratic governance is founded on. I will explore these hypotheses by analyzing 
the development of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) and those who 
advocated censoring it throughout the 1940’s and 50’s. This is a valuable source of 
information in American free speech history because the anti-communist measures 
of the 1950’s ultimately led to a marked change in First Amendment Jurisprudence 
in the U.S. After the Supreme Court deemed the anti-communist Smith Acts 
unconstitutional in Yates v. United States, the Court developed a new approach to 
Free Speech protection that took into consideration both the needs of the 
Marketplace of Ideas and the relationship between free speech and conceptions of 
democratic self-government. This new jurisprudence was based on maximizing 
state tolerance for unpopular speech by censoring only direct calls for illegal 
activity. In order to justify this expanded tolerance the Court emphasized the 
importance of an notion of citizenship wherein each individual is guaranteed the 
                                                        
2 Post, Robert, Democracy and Equality, 27 
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space necessary to create his or her own ideologies. Rather than justifying the 
Marketplace of Ideas as a way of finding a single truth, this new model protects the 
Marketplace as a way of allowing individuals to develop their own notions of truth 
that will then compete for acceptance by their peers. By rejecting the idea of 
ideological parameters for the Marketplace, this model expands the definition of a 
legitimate citizen by affirming access to the Democratic process for all individuals 
regardless of beliefs.   
Marketplace of Ideas v. Democratic Self Governance 
 
 The “Marketplace of Ideas”, first developed by the 19th century philosopher 
John Stuart Mills3, boils down to the belief that by adding more and more 
perspectives to the ongoing debate that drives Governmental Policy, the best ideas 
would gain ever-increasing support while ideas that did not hold up to logical, or 
political, competition would fall to the wayside. While this is a clear over-
simplification, ignoring many of the cognitive benefits that J.S. Mills believes come 
with free and open debate, it establishes the fact that one of the main tenants of this 
framework is the utility of Speech. The question isn’t necessarily what free speech 
can do for the individual: it is what free speech can do for the state. This doesn’t 
mean the individual is not considered in the Marketplace of Ideas: J.S. Mills believed 
“the human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, and even moral 
preference, are exercised only in making a choice”4. This development of individual 
                                                        
3 Mills, J.S., On Liberty 
4 Ibid, 23 
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agency was more a fringe benefit, however, compared to the political truths that the 
state could only realize through an open and engaging public discourse.  
 Although this philosophy has received broad support in modern legal history, 
one of the main debates in American Free Speech Jurisprudence is how exactly to 
create an effective marketplace. Some scholars argue that the Marketplace of Ideas, 
just like an economic marketplace, must be regulated in a way that promotes the 
best possible discourse5.  In this type of system, “what is essential is not that 
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said”6. The 
Marketplace, therefore, is only useful when it is effectively harnessed in a way that 
helps develop what is considered by the government to be a “correct” ideology. 
Thusly, government acts as a moderator that, through selective regulation, allows 
what the censors believe to be the most reasonable arguments to be presented 
while screening out speech that is considered biased or having a negative impact on 
the intellectual efficacy of the discussion7. Certain ideas or means of expression are 
censored not out of a fear over that speech’s ability to incite violence and lawless 
action, but out of a fear over how that speech could damage the intellectual and 
political integrity of the discourse.  
 This push for active government regulation designed to create a just and 
effective marketplace has played a part in many aspects of modern First 
Amendment Jurisprudence. One clear example of this is the Miller Test created in 
Justice Burger’s decision in Miller v. California in order to determine what material 
                                                        
5 Sunstein, Cass, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 28-43 
6 Post, Robert, Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse 
7 Stone, 2967 
 9 
can be considered “obscene”. While the test has three parts, the most relevant to the 
concept of a regulated Marketplace of Ideas is the final prong, which states that, 
when judging something to be obscene, it must be considered “whether the work, as 
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”8. While the other 
two parts of the test are focused on determining whether or not something can be 
construed as “sexually offensive”, this final prong is meant to make sure that any 
works that are sexually offensive but may benefit the intellectual and artistic 
development of the United States are allowed to enter the Marketplace of Ideas. In 
this way, the government is in theory preventing material that may offend the 
community from being publicly presented while still allowing the free exchange of 
relevant and engaging ideas.  
 Another prominent example of the Court’s desire to regulate the Marketplace 
of Ideas is the long history of Campaign Finance regulation.  As the Court explained 
in Buckley v. Valeo, in a time where money is an essential component of successful 
political campaigns and “large contributions are given to secure political quid pro 
quos from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 
representative democracy is undermined”. 9 In doing so, the Marketplace of Ideas is 
distorted to better reflect the desires and ideologies of those who can make such 
large contributions. This is a particularly illustrative example because it actively 
seeks to remove certain individuals, or at least limit the speech of certain 
individuals, from the political process due to perceived fears of the consequences 
that speech may yield. In this case, the fear is that money gives disproportionate 
                                                        
8 Miller v. California, Chopper, 357-361 
9 Chopper, 571 
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influence to those who have access to expanded resources, thereby undermining the 
equal access inherent in Democratic governments.  
  Although these examples demonstrate the widespread acceptance of the 
need to regulate the Marketplace of Ideas, the Supreme Court has been much more 
hesitant to regulate political ideologies in the name of creating a more functional 
public discourse. As one critic explained, “the individuals who have been the major 
beneficiaries of Free Speech jurisprudence…are not social valued dissidents but 
those whose values are deemed annoying at best and dangerous at worst”10 From 
the Ku Klux Klan11 to Vietnam War Protestors12, the Supreme Court has expanded 
the rights of expression for ideological minorities. In particular, the protection of 
hate speech has come under harsh criticism from many legal critiques who argue 
that such speech causes irreparable harm to the Marketplace of Ideas by promoting 
intolerance in the speakers and a sense of inferiority in the victims of such speech. 13  
This hesitance towards regulating such political ideologies is not born out of a 
refusal to embrace the Marketplace of Ideas when it comes to political ideologies: 
many of the decisions that established these protections for ideological minorities 
were based on the Court’s desire to create as open and free-flowing a Marketplace 
as possible. Rather, this refusal to embrace political censorship in the name of 
marketplace maintenance is born out of the Court’s recognition of the importance of 
                                                        
10 Schauer, Frederick, Codifying the First Amendment 
11 Chopper, 316 
12 Tinker v. Des Moines, O’Brien, 664 
13 Delgado, Richard, Are Hate Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven 
Gey 
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another school of thought in First Amendment Jurisprudence: the Democratic Self-
Governance model of speech.14 
  According to this model, the value of speech isn’t necessarily that it allows 
for the best and most productive ides to rise to the top. Rather, the benefit of Free 
Speech is the connection it establishes between the will of the individual and the 
actions of the state. This interpretation is founded on an understanding that 
“collective decision making is merely oppressive unless there is some internal 
connection between the particular will of individual citizens and the general will of 
the collectivity”15 If an individual is unable to inject their own opinions into the 
larger political discourse, they will be unable to contribute to the ongoing public 
discourse that drives decision making in Democratic governments. In this way, 
censoring individuals right to speech impairs the ability of individual citizens to 
develop a sense of control over the political process. Without this sense of agency, 
the censored individual is no longer an active, contributing citizen in a democracy: 
they are politically silent subjects to the wills of the uncensored majorities.  
 This emphasis on democratic self-governance versus a regulated 
Marketplace of Ideas can be seen in a number of Supreme Court cases. In Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, decided in 1987, the Court deemed a Florida law 
requiring news outlets to permit candidates the right to reply against any criticisms. 
As the Court explained, the law produces a chilling effect on speech by incentivizing 
editors to avoid controversies, thereby inadvertently censoring the speech of 
individuals based on their political ideas. Even in the previously discussed case of 
                                                        
14 Post, Individual Autonomy and Self Governance, 16 
15 Post, Democracy and Equality, 27  
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limitations on financial contributions to political campaigns, the Court has been 
clear that this does not mean that limitations can be placed on the independent 
expenditures of campaigns or how much a candidate him or herself donates to their 
campaign.  While accepting a need to limit campaign contributions in order to 
prevent disproportionate influence in the political process, they simultaneously 
ruled “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.” As this shows, while the court is willing to regulate speech at times, it 
has made a point of rejecting laws designed to regulate the marketplace that may 
result in the censorship of certain political ideologies. 
  This conflict demonstrates one of the main conflicts between the Democratic 
Self-Governance school of thought and the Marketplace of Ideas school of thought, 
namely the fact that the Marketplace theory, by emphasizing the political utility of 
speech, opens up the door to the censorship of ideas that are considered 
“unacceptable” because of the negative impact they have on the efficacy of the 
overall political discourse. This can clearly be seen in the theories on obscenity and 
hate speech discussed earlier. In both of these situations, proponents of censorship 
have determined that these ideas cause such a decided degradation in the quality 
and direction of political conversations that allowing them complete expression 
would corrupt and undermine the nation’s public discourse. While the Marketplace, 
as Justice Holmes articulated in Abrams, is predicated on the protection of politically 
and socially unpopular ideas, the fact that its ultimate goal is the determination of 
“truth” suggests that definite political truths do indeed exist. If this premise is 
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accepted, it is the responsibility of the State to prevent certain dangerous ideas from 
corrupting the integrity of the political system.   
 This concept of inalienable moral codes has serious implications for the 
Democratic Identity of both the individuals being censored and those that are 
advocating censorship. For the censored groups, they are made to feel as if they are 
completely outside the realm of Democratic politics. In doing so, censorship fosters 
a sense of institutional hopelessness that is a driving force behind the development 
of non-democratic means of instituting change. For those that advocate censorship, 
the creation of moral codes, and the subsequent rejection of groups whose 
ideologies fall outside these codes, creates a stratified perspective towards 
democracy where certain individuals are allowed access to governmental policy and 
others are not. This undermines the notion of equal institutional access to the 
government that is one of the underlying components of Democracy16. In this way, 
political censorship alters the Democratic nature of an entire state by creating a 
culture of stratified democratic access.  
 This view of distinct ethical norms is in stark contrast to Democratic Self-
Governance School, which “denies that there can be any possible neutral position 
within public discourse, because public discourse is precisely the site of political 
contention about the nature of collective identity”17. In this view, it is impossible to 
ever ascertain “the truth” because “the truth is not a constant: it is a socially defined 
perspective based on unique political and social ideologies.” This relativist 
perspective towards truth has been codified into American Free Speech 
                                                        
16 Post, Democracy and Equality 
17 Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, 2369 
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Jurisprudence through the institutionalization of “content-neutrality”18 when 
analyzing the scope of Speech protection. According to this principle, the Court 
cannot consider the moral or political implications of ideologies when determining 
whether or not they deserve protection under the First Amendment: all they must 
determine is whether it is some form of political speech. While this does not protect 
speech in the form of illegal actions, such as the burning of draft cards19, or speech 
that incites “imminent lawless action”20, it has pushed the court to protect even the 
most socially repugnant speech in order to prevent the formation of a tyranny of the 
majority.  
Anti-Communism and a New Jurisprudence 
 
 This neutrality, however, is a relatively recent development. Up until the late 
1950’s, the newly accepted Marketplace of Ideas jurisprudence, while promoting 
certain protections, often led to the suppression of political speech that was viewed 
to be promoting the overthrow of the United States Government21. One of the most 
notable examples of ideologically motivated censorship in this era is the state 
censorship of the CPUSA from the mid to late 40’s to the late 50’s. Although this 
censorship took a variety of forms, it always had the same underlying justification: 
the need to protect the United States from the spread of an ideology that many 
perceived to be predicated on the violent overthrow of non-communist 
governments. The individuals behind these restrictions didn’t view Communism as a 
                                                        
18 Stone, Geoffrey, Content-Neutral Restrictions 
19 Tinker v Des Moines Independent Community School District, O’Brien, 664 
20 Brandenburg v. Ohio, Chopper, 316 
21 Stone, Geoffrey, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A Cautionary Tale, 1393-1396 
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political platform: they viewed as an existential threat to the very existence of the 
United States. In light of this, they moved to prevent these “dangerous” ideologies 
from being spread, often with the Supreme Court’s consent. In the wake of this 
massive censorship, the concept of what American democracy meant came into 
question. Would America tolerate opinions that many considered a legitimate threat 
to their way of life or would they create strict ideological boundaries within the 
state? In the end, the Supreme Court, decided that groups could not be persecuted 
for simply discussing the idea of revolution: they had to actively engage in the steps 
of planning and enacting a violent revolution22. In doing so, the Court created a new 
perspective on the government’s relationship to ideological dissent wherein citizens 
ideologies, no matter how abstractly hostile and unpopular, had to be tolerated. 
They were citizens, and unless they actively were working towards committing 
illegal activities, they could advocate anything they wanted.  In the wake of the 
paranoid, witch-hunt environment of the Red Scare, this distinction was the 
necessary divider that created the basis for the content-neutral jurisprudence of 
contemporary First Amendment Jurisprudence23.  
 While the impact of the Yates decision has been recognized as an important 
part of free speech jurisprudential development in the latter part of the 20th 
century,24 it has often been presented as more of an indicator of the possibility for 
future change rather than an actual agent in creating that change. Instead, many 
scholars have seen to the Warren Court’s work in the 1960’s, such as their decisions 
                                                        
22 Chopper, 316 
23 Stone, Geoffrey, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy 
24 Murphy, Paul, The Shaping of the First Amendment, 112 
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in Tinker v. Des Moines and Brandenburg v. Ohio, as the critical decisions that have 
gone on to define modern Free Speech doctrine.25 While I agree that these decisions 
did create many of the structures of contemporary Free Speech doctrine, such as the 
“Imminent Lawless Action” test derived from Brandenburg, I think these 
developments are in fact expansions and, in a way, realizations of the decisions 
made by the Supreme Court in Yates v. United States. By imbuing the Marketplace of 
Ideas framework with an emphasis on expanded notions of what constitutes 
citizens, this decision harkened a new merger of the Marketplace of Ideas and 
Democratic Self-Governance schools of thought. 
 In order to better understand the influences behind this monumental change 
in Free Speech in the U.S., I will analyze the changes in the Democratic Identity of the 
CPUSA and those who directly called for their censorship. In order to do this, I will 
look at the rhetorical and strategic changes of the CPUSA and the Anti-Communist 
movement in response to these shifting identities. Furthermore, I will demonstrate 
the way in which these developments ultimately led to a change in the Court’s 
jurisprudence that rejected the existence of ideological boundaries within the 
Marketplace of Ideas. In doing so, I hope to not only reveal the political history that 
continues to define the way American jurists see Free Speech protection, but also to 
better understand the dynamic between Democratic Identity and Speech Regulation. 
 
  
                                                        
25 Ibid, 127 
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History of Political Speech Jurisprudence 
 
 Like all “inalienable rights”, the First Amendment is not a static, unchanging 
entity: it is a socially constructed idea that exists within a given political context. 
That does not mean, however, that each generation creates an entirely new 
approach towards Freedom of Speech. Changes are built upon previous changes, 
and therefore in order to truly understand the importance and impact of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Yates, it is essential to understand the historical 
trajectory that led to that moment. Only then can we understand what the Justices 
were trying to accomplish, as it was this history they were working from. 
Localism and Majority Rule  
 
 Like much of American Constitutional Law, the origin of Free Speech 
jurisprudence, more specifically political speech jurisprudence, lies with English 
Common Law, as codified by the Judge William Blackstone in the middle of the 18th 
century. Although these laws made provisions to guarantee free speech, what 
exactly constituted free speech was radically different than how it seen today. The 
crux of this difference is the Common Law’s emphasis on prohibiting prior restraint, 
whereby the Government prevents an individual from voicing a particular opinion. 
Long a favored method of the English Crown in stemming oppositional opinions, 26 
the practice fell sharply out of favor following the English Revolution of the 1680’s 
and quickly came to be seen as the major obstacle towards free speech. This new 
hostility towards prior restraint, however, did not mean that individuals were free 
                                                        
26 Murphy, 15 
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from government punishment for voicing unpopular opinions. While prohibitions 
on prior restraint prevented the government from preventing unpopular opinions 
from being stated, it was entirely within its power to punish individuals after the 
fact for stating those unpopular opinions. In essence, individuals were free to 
express themselves, as long as they accepted the price that speech may come with.27 
To many of the framers of the Constitution, prior restraint was the only real 
opposition to free political speech. 
 To contemporary Americans, this seems like tenuous logic: by allowing the 
government to punish opinions they deemed unpopular, the law served as a 
deterrent for Free Expression in much the same way that prior restraint did. This 
reading, however, ignores the fundamentally different relationship between the 
citizen and the state that existed in pre-industrial America. In this era, many held 
the greatest threat to individual freedoms to be a highly centralized state that 
represented the interests of the distant few, a fear firmly established by the rule of 
the British Empire.28 One solution to this crisis was the strengthening of local 
governments and state governments. These institutions, due to their physical 
proximity and smaller populations, would be more responsive to the needs of their 
constituents. 29 This emphasis on localism is why the Bill of Rights was originally 
designed only to restrict the actions of the Federal Government. In such an 
environment, “circumstances seemed to dictate that through politics and political 
participation, collectivities of voters, state and local, would determine the 
                                                        
27 Ibid, 16 
28 Anti-Federalist Papers 
29 Brutus no. 1, Anti-Federalist Papers 
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appropriate policies in those areas”30. In this system, the right to Free Speech was 
not a universal protection of unpopular expression, but a continuum whose 
boundaries could be decided by the interests and morals of the particular 
population where that speech arose. 
 This democratic approach towards speech regulation demonstrates the 
relationship between a sense on “belonging” to a specific ideological or political 
entity and free speech. The basis of this difference is the fact that this approach was 
designed to protect the majority from the will of a powerful minority. Rather than a 
mechanism of protecting the “other”, this approach was designed to protect the 
majority from that “other”.  Indeed, in the early days of the United States, “newly 
freed American communities had little time for dissenters who did not subscribe to 
all the norms that the community leaders set down. Direct democracy tended to 
reflect respect for freedom of “right” ideas”.31 In this way, Free Speech was designed 
as a way of allowing the community to define its priorities and guiding principles 
without interference from minority powers in government. Minority ideas, on the 
other hand, were forced to either succeed in the Democratic process or be silenced. 
  While an emphasis on localism rather than centralization was a key aspect of 
the Antebellum approach towards individual rights, it was not the only part. Just as 
important was limiting the scope of the Federal Government’s authority. This 
proposed solution originated during the debates over whether or not to include a 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The question was whether “one [should] limit the 
powers of government to a set of acceptable responsibilities, or one [should] grant 
                                                        
30 Murphy, 45 
31 Ibid, 12 
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the government general powers and then reduce those powers through an 
articulation of specific exceptions”32. Although the Bill of Rights was eventually 
ratified, it was almost universally accepted amongst the framers of the Constitution 
that the key to protecting the rights of citizens lied in the limitations placed on 
Congressional powers in articles 1 and 8 of the Constitution 33. In this framework 
the limits on government power would be the main bulwark against tyranny, with 
the Bill of Rights serving as a last line of defense. 
 This emphasis on limited government, in light of the American’s 
aforementioned focus on localism, did not extend to the states. This did not mean, 
however, that the State governments could do as they please. The main restriction 
on these legislative bodies was the firmly held belief that there were certain natural 
limitations on what an assembly could and could not do, such as a violation of firmly 
established legal rights (i.e. property rights). At the core of these restrictions was a 
belief that state action, above all else, had to serve public, not private, interests. This 
is in keeping with the limited scope of government because rather than actively 
protecting certain individual rights, “the people granted to their legislators, not the 
general authority to act as they wished, but the more specific authority to act in the 
public interest, and any law that represented mere ‘class legislation’ or an ‘arbitrary 
interference’ with liberty or property went beyond a legislatures constitutionally 
delegated authority”.34 This emphasis on the purpose and public effects of 
legislation rather than the impact it had on individual’s is in line with the broader 
                                                        
32 Gillman, pg. 626 
33 Ibid, 627 
34 Gillman, 630 
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philosophy of limited government because it combatted the main concern of 
antebellum America: the formation of a government advancing the interests of one 
faction over all others.35 If you were within the ideological majority, than your 
speech was protected. If you were not, however, than you were at the whims of the 
Democratic system.  
 This emphasis on limited government rather than the development of a 
system of protected rights kept the Supreme Court from developing a 
comprehensive doctrine towards Free Speech for much of American history. This is 
not meant to suggest that there was no recognition of individual rights, but rather 
that the legislature, not the courts should define the legal boundaries of these rights. 
The first notable example of this is the Sedition Act of 1798. Fueled by a 
combination of the growing antipathy between the Federalist Adams administration 
and the Jeffersonian Anti-Federalists, the act prohibited any person to voice any 
opinions on the government and its representatives “with intent to defame….or to 
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, 
the hatred of the good people of the United States”36. This law, which rested on the 
legal concept of seditious libel, was used to target a number of the newspapers 
employed by the anti-Federalists to support their various political enterprises. They 
justified these actions by claiming that those censored were part of a small, 
subversives minority seeking to undermine the Federalist majority.37 Anti-
Federalists, on the other hand, saw an attempt by a minority power in government 
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to silence the powerless masses. This backlash eventually helped Thomas Jefferson 
win the Presidential election of 1800, and he quickly revoked the laws and pardoned 
all those prosecuted under it. The fact that the debate between Federalists and Anti-
Federalists concerned who justifiably represented the majority, rather than the 
justness of censoring ideological minorities, demonstrates the way in which early 
American Free Speech philosophy was based on protecting the majority, not the 
minority. 
 While controversies over free speech continued to arise on the local and state 
level throughout the early part of the 18th century, it was the national debate over 
slavery that created the next great national crisis concerning the censorship of 
speech. As the Abolitionist movement gained strength, the number of anti-slavery 
publications increased dramatically. The threat this posed to the slave system was 
not lost on Southern Democrats. In order to stymie this danger, a number of 
Southern States imposed a series of postal regulations that prohibited any 
prohibitionist’s literature from entering their state. 38 Even in territories where no 
formal laws were created prohibiting anti-slavery publications, pro-slavery 
communities often took it upon themselves to keep such incendiary talk to a 
minimum. Such was the case for Elijah Lovejoy, an abolitionist pamphleteer who 
was lynched in 1837 in Alton, Illinois while protecting his printing press.39 While 
these laws and acts of mob violence served to embolden abolitionists, it was not 
until the legal censorship reached the Federal Government that it became an issue of 
national importance. 
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 The national debate over state censorship of abolitionist ideas was ignited by 
Congress’ enactment of the Gag Rule preventing the presentation of any abolitionist 
petitions in 1836. Justified as a response to the disruptive nature of the seemingly 
endless supply of petitions, the law was seen by Abolitionists as an attempt to 
prevent them from having any influence on legislation.40 Ironically enough, it was 
John Quincy Adams, former president, current Massachusetts’s representative, and 
son of the architect of the Sedition Act, who immediately turned the Gag Rule debate 
into a question of civil liberties.41 In doing so, Adams and his supporters 
transformed the Gag Rule from a minor blow to the Abolitionist movement to a 
major victory, as now Abolitionists were able to connect advocacy of slavery with a 
rejection of civil liberties 42. As one Virginian noticed, “the argument over petitions 
made more abolitionists in one year, by identifying the right to petition with the 
question of slavery, than the abolitionists would have made for themselves in 
twenty-five years”. Eventually, in the wake of this national controversy, the Gag Rule 
was repealed in 1844.  
 While this era of politically, rather than constitutionally, protected rights to 
Free Expression was often marked by localized, majoritarian suppression of 
unpopular opinions43, such as local ordinances against blasphemy and the 
aforementioned state laws preventing the proliferation of anti-slavery literature, 
these episodes demonstrate that the American people did, to a degree, believe in a 
form of free speech. The central tenant of this view was that censorship had to be 
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based on a desire to advance the common good rather than trying to bolster the 
power of particular sectors of society.44 The Alien And Sedition Act, by punishing 
Anti-Federalists and other groups antagonistic to the Federalist Party solely for 
their disagreement with the Adams administration, the law represents a clear 
attempt to silence one political group for the benefit of another. This framework can 
again be seen in the controversy over the Gag rule, as critics of the law held that it 
was designed not to stream line legislative action but remove a certain ideological 
faction, the abolitionists, from the political realm because of the threat it posed to 
another faction, the slave owners. In this framework, democratic means control of 
speech rights is based on the assumption that the state will have the interests of 
society as a whole in mind when deciding which opinions to censors and which to 
permit. 
 By embracing censorship when enacted for “the greater good”, this 
framework created the necessary space for one of the major phenomena in 
traditional American Free Speech jurisprudence: state censorship of opinions that 
were deemed by the majority of voting citizens as “un-American”. At the heart of 
this emphasis on Americanism was a brand of xenophobia that equated foreignness 
with the type of dual loyalty that undermines the citizenship of modern states.45 A 
major justification for the Alien and Sedition Act was the Federalist Party’s attempt 
to quash the Anti-Federalists support for the French Revolution.46 To do so, they 
                                                        
44  
45 This is an idea more extensively discussed by Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan in 
explaining the need for maintain only one sovereign 
46 Martin, James P., When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Federalist 
Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 140 
 25
connected these views to the whims of dangerous French radicals that sought to 
undermine the new nation’s independence from the affairs of Europe. This pattern 
was again at work in the creation of the Gag rule, as Southern supporters believed 
that abolitionists were going against one of the main economic and social 
underpinnings of their culture and indeed of American prosperity. In both of these 
cases, by placing the targeted individuals in opposition to the general American 
community, they justified their censorship as a way of advancing the greater good.  
Although this was not the only justification for speech censorship, most notably the 
central place of prohibitions on seditious libel, it was of central importance in 
determining whether or not certain ideologies, rather than individual forms of 
speech, could be tolerated. 
 The logic behind this interpretation of Free Speech is that un-American forms 
of dissent don’t simply arise from differently minded citizens, but traitorous 
foreigners “duping their innocent followers and demanding that their loyalty be 
transferred from obedience to central American values to the service of anti-
American philosophies”47. This xenophobic perspective forms the crucial link 
between democratic identity and political speech in the U.S. An ideology being 
different or even repugnant to certain parties, or even the majority of citizens, alone 
does not create a standard for censorship. When this repugnance, however, is 
framed as inherently un-American it becomes an active threat to the stability of 
American political culture, and in the eyes of many, the American state itself. In 
doing so, censorship does not violate the civil rights of those that are censored 
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because these individuals have been branded as enemies of the state, thereby 
forfeiting the protections afforded to citizens. This emphasis on fealty to an 
idealized concept of “Americanism” demonstrates one of the crucial components of 
this system: a belief in an unchanging and inalienable definition of what it means to 
be an American.  
The “Other” and War 
 
 This ideological “othering” of political dissent, as can be expected, is most 
pronounced in times of war. One of the most notable examples of this is President 
Lincoln’s abolishment of habeas corpus for accused Confederate sympathizers 
during the Civil War. While habeas corpus is not directly related to free speech, 
Lincoln’s suspension of this right was often targeted at individuals who voiced 
support for the Confederacy, thereby removing them from the nation’s political 
dialogue. While the Constitution states in Section 1, Article 9 that the Habeas Corpus 
may only be suspended by Congress “when in cases of rebellion and invasion the 
public safety may require it”, the Lincoln Administration, working in an 
environment where there was a very real fear that the Union would soon find “every 
department of the government paralyzed by fear”48, felt that the only possible way 
to prevent this disloyalty from undermining the Union war effort was to vigorously 
nip it in the bud without the encumbrances of trials, or even legislative consent. 
While Lincoln privately fretted over the legal implications of his actions, publicly he 
presented the restrictions as an ugly wartime necessity.49  In these terms, the 
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suspension of Free Speech is a form of self-defense for a state teetering on the brink 
of the abyss. 
 This idea of censorship as a logical, ethical extension of a state’s right to 
protect its existence is the cornerstone of the “Nativist” approach towards Free 
Expression. In order to understand this, it is important to first understand the fact 
that ideological repression is relatively logical. If the main concern of those in power 
is to stay in power, one way to guarantee this outcome is to prevent the formation of 
any oppositional forces that may rise against you50. In pre-modern Western states, 
where the authority of the ruler is paramount rather than the needs of its subjects, 
this was the accepted norm. In the modern era, however, such blind pursuit of 
power goes against the principle of popular rule.  This violation, however, can be 
justified if the censorship is not based on the ruling elite’s desire to stay in power, 
but instead their desire to protect the integrity of the State. Again, this line of 
reasoning is logical, but this time it comes with the added force of political 
legitimacy. This legitimacy is based on the Social Contract theory that the rights of 
modern citizens, while providing a number of social and cultural benefits, are 
grounded in the State’s ability to maintain order and the prevention of arbitrary 
violence against its citizens. 51 Without this non-violent order, the various rights of 
citizens are sacrificed to one simple truth: might makes right. Even if a small 
percentage of individuals decided to embrace this philosophy, without a State to 
deter them, they would overwhelm their pacified neighbors. In order to prevent 
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this, the state establishes a monopoly on violence designed to promote the interests 
of the people, and if domestic forces threaten this monopoly, it is the government’s 
responsibility to re-establish control. Although this is only one of a number of 
different competing Social Contract theories, most notably Locke’s more 
individualistically minded framework, 52 Hobbes influence on the place of security 
in defining the confines of a modern state have played a large role in the 
development of American Democracy.53 
 With this understanding of censorship as a form of state-based self-defense, 
the use of foreignness as a justification for political censorship makes logical sense. 
If a person or people have a specific view of what America is, whether it’s a nation 
built on Judeo-Christian values or one based on secular Enlightenment thinking, 
then anybody who professes ideas explicitly counter those ideas could be viewed as 
a threat to the continued existence of those principles. This logical conclusion 
develops an increased urgency when these differences are viewed not as a contrast 
in interpretations of the American nation, but instead as an attempt to impose on 
America certain “un-American” ideals. Only by preventing these individuals form 
professing these ideas can the State protect itself from being infected by foreign-
born concepts that refute the core of Americanism. With this logic in mind, labeling 
certain ideologies, and those who advocate for them as “foreign” becomes a 
powerful political tool. By grounding censorship in an attempt to fight back foreign 
subversion, the actions of the censors are transformed from a vindictive attempt to 
silence a minority to a valiant crusade to save America. 
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 Although not directly related to Free Speech, James Madison’s critique of 
factions effectively illustrates the way in which the notion of foreignness can lead to 
the removal of certain groups from the political body.54 As he explains, political 
factions do not view opposing groups as political hurdles that can be defeated 
within the larger Democratic system, but as enemies against what they have defined 
as the ultimate political truth who must be removed from the larger political body 
before it corrupts it from the inside.  The irreconcilable nature of these differences 
are the greatest threat to any Republican government because they divide a nation 
among itself as citizens come to view each other not as parts of the same political 
family, but as diametrically opposed forces that happen to inhabit the same country. 
This directly relates to the use of “othering” in Free Speech jurisprudence because it 
demonstrates how political ideologies can change from reasonable opinions into 
absolute facts by their advocates. This ultimately leads them to view their 
opponents’ opinions as invalid hurdles on the road to absolute truth. From this 
perspective, removing them from the political system is not only strategically 
advisable, but also politically essential for the continued survival of the state. By 
placing control over political censorship in the hands of majoritarian mechanisms, 
combined with the rationale that any restrictions of speech based on the common 
good is justified, censorship will be developed on the basis of the accepted norms of 
whichever faction is currently in power. 
 Despite this long-standing condemnation of factions as anti-American, a 
condemnation explicitly articulated by President George Washington in his Farewell 
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Address that has shaped American political thought to this day, the continued 
existence of repressive government policies up to and during the Civil War 
demonstrate a continued emphasis on ideological unity and national security rather 
than pluralism. There were, however, signs of changing opinions. Most notable of 
these shifts is the Supreme Court’s 1866 decision in ex parte Milligan to deem 
President Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus and enactment of Martial Law due 
to threatened invasion as unconstitutional. As the Court explained, “The necessity 
must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts 
and disposes the civil administration”55. Although this decision was related to 
suspension of the democratic and legal norms of the U.S. as a whole, the precedent it 
establishes is clear: the rights of citizens cannot be revoked due solely to perceived 
national security threats. Only by demonstrating the imminence, rather than the 
abstract possibility, of such an attack can individual rights be denied. While this 
ruling clearly echoes Justice Brandeis sentiments in his “clear and present danger” 
test some 60 years later, only after the Industrial Revolution and the numerous 
social and political changes it brought about would this connection between denying 
certain individual rights and the imminence of security threats be cemented into 
policy.  
The Industrial Revolution   
 
While the Industrial Revolution transformed America into one of the major 
economic powers in the world, it also created a degree of economic and social 
stratification that many at the time believed threatened American liberty and 
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equality. America’s transformation from a rural, agrarian society to an industrialized 
member of the international economy “triggered unprecedented demands for 
legislation that would mitigate some of the social costs of industrialization and, in 
particular, would extend special protection to those classes that felt victimized by 
coercive market mechanisms”56 The problem facing these newly inspired activists 
was that the existing system of Individual rights was grounded in the protection of 
the property rights that provided the legal underpinnings for the economic 
inequalities of the time. In order to rectify this, a new generation of legal jurists 
began to question the efficacy of the traditional, limited government-residual 
freedoms approach to Constitutional jurisprudence.57 Instead, these individuals 
called for the expansion of State authority to permit it to regulate economic affairs, 
as seen by the ratification of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1897, while 
simultaneously creating a comprehensive set of individual freedoms that the now-
empowered Federal government could not violate.  This radically altered the 
relationship between the State and the individual by giving the Government a new 
degree of influence on day-to-day life while also establishing certain rights that 
could not be violated unless absolutely necessary. From a jurisprudential 
perspective, the burden shifted from requiring the state to prove a law served the 
public good to requiring the state to prove a law did not violate the enumerated 
rights of the affected individuals.  
 Controversies over the implications this proposed shift in the nation’s 
jurisprudential framework had for the regulation of speech were particularly 
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pronounced. This is in large part due to the fact that the proponents of the 
legislative goals this new approach was created to justify often came under harsh 
government censorship. In particular, the labor movement of the late nineteenth 
century, and the various political ideologies it was attached to, was continually 
harassed by government officials that viewed them as dangerous threats to 
America’s economic and political well being.  The reason that this movement faced 
continual state censorship is because they challenged the prevailing connections 
between economic freedom and individual freedom that undergirded the laissez 
faire policies of the Industrial Revolution58. This approach, which expanded upon 
the U.S.’s long-standing emphasis on the protection of individual property rights, 
argued that the right to free expression rested on “the individual’s right to a 
material basis for the liberty and the right to communicate with others through the 
market device of contract”59.  In this perspective, economic liberty was the true 
guarantee of individual liberty because property interactions were the basis for 
social development in Capitalist societies. 
 The full scope of this revolution of Constitutional analysis in terms of Free 
Speech jurisprudence was quickly put to the test by one of the major social 
phenomenon’s in American history: European immigration to the U.S. This influx, 
fueled by a combination of expanding opportunities in the U.S. and socio-political 
crises throughout Europe, 60 brought not only the working masses that fueled 
America’s economic transformation, but new political and social ideas. Communism, 
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socialism, utopianism, anarchism, and European nationalism: all these ideas and 
more found support in the ethnic neighborhoods that formed the vanguard of 
America’s rapid urbanization. As can be expected, while some Americans praised 
these new ideas, others saw them as a threat to what they saw as the American way 
of life. The widespread nature of this “patriotically” based condemnation can be 
seen in the influence and scope of Nativist organization of the time like the Know 
Nothing Party. Early on, the main targets of these efforts were Anarchists. In 
response to the Haymarket Riots of 1886, where several police officers were killed 
at an anarchist rally when somebody in the crowd threw a bomb, the Chicago press 
rallied behind the ide that “radicals of this kind could not come to America and 
abuse the precious right of free speech”. 61 This idea that radicals were “abusing” 
speech was a continuation of America’s Free Speech jurisprudence that legitimized 
the labeling of certain ideas as dangerously un-American. Eventually, this 
xenophobic rejection of Anarchism led to the Immigration Act of 1903, which 
formally barred any individuals connected to Anarchist ideology from immigrating 
to the U.S. The message this law sends is clear: Anarchy doesn’t belong in the United 
States, and neither do those that support it.  
 While these xenophobic policies created major conflicts, notably in the 
continuing struggles of the Labor Movement, the patriotism fostered by World War I 
provided the ideological and political capital needed to expand these efforts to 
previously unimaginable heights. The sweeping scope of state-based repression at 
this time is best represented through the Espionage Act of 1917 and the series of 
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amendments attached to it known as the Sedition Act of 1918. World War I, like the 
Civil War before it, established national security as the nation’s absolute priority. In 
doing so, the need to root out and destroy any threats to that security, whether real 
or imagined, was of utmost importance. In particular, the Sedition Act moved 
beyond the Lincoln’s emphasis on active government infiltration and sought to 
prosecute “any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of 
government of the United States”, which encompassed nearly any form of 
opposition to World War I.62 The act was designed not only to strike out against 
support of America’s military enemies, but any ideological groups that hampered 
the ongoing war effort. Anybody outside the acceptable ideological realm, namely 
active support for the American war effort, was place outside the realm of 
acceptable citizenship and punished. 
 This represented a significant expansion of existing notions of censorship 
because it in effect illegalized critique of American Government. In doing so, these 
laws provided the push that would initiate the development of Modern Free Speech 
doctrine. The first signifier of this shift in approach, however, did not come from the 
Supreme Court. Instead, it was the decision of District Judge Learned Hand in Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten in 1917 that would go down in history as the turning point 
for political speech in the United States. The case concerned the prosecution of The 
Masses, a revolutionary magazine that criticized the U.S.’s decision to enter the war 
and supported those who chose not to fight in it. Justice Hand overturned the arrest 
on the grounds that the censorship of speech should be judged not by “the justice of 
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its substance, nor the decency and propriety of its temper, but the strong danger 
that it would cause injurious acts”. 63 In emphasizing the effect of the words 
themselves, rather than the abstract ideas those words represented, Justice Hand’s 
decision attempted to strengthen the burden of proof necessary for the State to 
silence its critics. In doing so, it established a degree of causality and intentionality 
that had never been discussed before. Within this doctrine, it was not enough that 
an individual supported unpopular or perhaps even unjust acts: they had to actively 
be attempting to support those acts. Although the decision was eventually 
overturned on appeals, it laid the groundwork for one of the most important 
decision in United State’s Free Speech jurisprudence: Schenck v. United States. 
The Clear and Present Danger Test and an American Marketplace 
 
  The facts of the case are relatively simple: Charles Schenck was the Secretary 
of the Socialist Party of America and was therefore responsible for the development 
and distribution of the party literature. Much of this literature was criticized the war 
effort, including some 15,000 leaflets sent to draftees urging them to resist the draft. 
In accordance with the Espionage Act, Schenck was charged with actively conspiring 
to undermine the U.S. war effort. Eventually, the Court upheld the decision to 
prosecute Mr. Schenck, deciding that the restrictions on the defendant’s free 
expression were legitimate in light of the ongoing war effort. In making this 
decision, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, “the question in every case is 
whether the worlds are used in such circumstances and are of such nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evil that 
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Congress has a right to prevent”64. In the eyes of the Court, seeing as Mr. Schenck 
was actively calling for individuals to commit an illegal activity, it was reasonable to 
assume that his words were used in a way that would bring about a course of action 
that would actively damage the war effort.  
 At the time, the decision hardly seemed like a step towards a new Free 
Speech doctrine. In fact, more liberal jurists and legal scholars like Justice Hand and 
Zechariah Chaffee voiced their discontent directly to Justice Holmes, seeing the 
decision as yet another concession to the needs of the state over the rights of the 
individual. 65 What was impossible to see at the time, however, was the fact that by 
introducing the clear and present danger test, Justice Holmes had laid the 
groundwork for the very expansion of individual rights that these two and many of 
their contemporaries sought after. The test, similar in form to that established by 
Justice Hand in Masses, created the demand for a clearer and more explicit 
connection between the speech being censored and the criminal activity the state 
was seeking to prevent. What was missing in each of these decisions was a positive 
justification for why this increased burden of proof was a social necessity. Justice 
Holmes provided just such a justification in the form of the Marketplace of Ideas. 
 Justice Holmes’ first use of the Marketplace of Ideas in discussing First 
Amendment doctrine was his dissent in Abrams v. United States in 1919. The 
defendants in the case were convicted under the Sedition Act for distributing 
pamphlets criticizing the decision to send a small Marine battalion to Russia as an 
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attempt to crush the Revolution and called for a general strike amongst workers. 
While similar in many ways to the Schenck case, there were notable differences that 
provided the rationale for Holmes’ dissent. Most importantly, whereas Charles 
Schenck was actively calling for a criminal activity, the defendants in Abrams were 
only stating their strong opposition to an American policy. This separation is vital 
because rather than directly calling for an illegal action, thereby triggering the 
causal link necessary to the clear and present danger test, the defendants in Abrams 
were simply presenting an opinion that could only be connected to criminal activity 
through the state’s more abstracted fear of domestic sedition. While the majority of 
the Court didn’t see the relevance of this distinction, Justice Holmes, joined by 
Justice Brandeis, dissented in an attempt to further establish the doctrinal meaning 
of the clear and present danger test. As he explained, “it is only the present danger 
of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a 
limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned”, 66 This 
emphasis on the direct connection between the targeted speech and the criminal 
activity helped distinguish the clear and present Danger test from previous 
rationales for censorship because it called for the state to actively prove the 
existence of a link rather than demonstrating that it was reasonable to believe such 
a link exists. In this way, the balancing of rights shifted decidedly in favor of the 
censored individuals. While this explanation of the proper parameters of the test 
was essential in establishing the protections it offered, it was Justice Holmes’ 
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inclusion of the Marketplace of Ideas that justified these considerably expanded 
boundaries. 
 The importance of the Marketplace of Ideas lies in the fact that it justified the 
possible political consequences of the clear and present danger test by rejecting the 
notion of a single, absolute political ideology. As Justice Holmes explains, tolerating 
opposition to political institutions based on the unquestioning acceptance of certain 
principles undermines the efficacy of those in power by showing that there is a 
possible alternative to their ideologies. However, “when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas”. This call for an open discourse as the only 
means of instituting effective political governance demonstrates the unique 
instrumental value of the Marketplace of Ideas: it rejects the idea that individuals 
can, on their own, develop inalienable and absolute truths. Instead, it proposes that 
political truths are best established by a collective decision-making process free of 
irrefutable truths and irredeemable untruths. This emphasis on ideological 
relativism justifies the jurisprudential expansion of free speech protection 
established by the clear and present danger test because it articulates the fact that 
more restrictive boundaries would hamper the pursuit of the most effective political 
ideologies.  
 By denying the existence of a single American ideology, the Marketplace 
entails a rejection of “othering” as a justification for political censorship. Without 
such the sanctification of a particular ideology as “American”, it is impossible for 
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certain groups to be censored as “anti-American” based on their ideological 
affiliations because there is no American ideology for them to violate. Even if an idea 
receives a little public support, this framework creates an understanding that the 
differences between popular and unpopular opinions are based on political 
circumstances, not irrefutable laws of morality. From this perspective, political 
deviants are seen as ideological minorities rather than unacceptable transgressors. 
This is a tremendous shift because it grants ideologies previously censored as 
foreign access to the political discourse. In this way, they are transformed from 
seditious aliens to true citizens. By demanding the protection of “expressions of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death”, 67 Justice Holmes’ 
demonstrates how the Marketplace requires the U.S. government to treat all 
ideologies, and those who advocate them, equally. In doing so, the Marketplace of 
Ideas transforms the very notion of foreignness by removing ideological parameters 
for American citizens.  
 By relying on the Marketplace of Ideas construct, Justice Holmes provided an 
instrumental justification that situated this new approach towards the First 
Amendment within the socially minded jurisprudence of the early 20th century. In 
essence, Free Speech became, jurisprudentially speaking, a vital part of America’s 
ongoing democratic experiment. In an era where progressive desires to address the 
social inequalities of the Industrial Revolution demanded policies be grounded in 
more than individualized benefit, Justice Holmes’ gave Free Speech a clear utility by 
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explaining that it forced individual beliefs to be put through the rigorous 
competition of an open marketplace before they are accepted as truths.  
 Although these cases introduced new theories into Political Speech 
jurisprudence, it would be some time before they were accepted as doctrine. After 
Schenck, wherein both Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes saw the state action as 
constitutional under the clear and present danger test, the two found themselves in 
the dissent for several important cases in an attempt to establish the full parameters 
of this new philosophy.  One major example of this success in spite of failure is the 
Court’s decision in Gitlow v. New York in 1925, a case often marked as the beginning 
of the legal process of incorporation, whereby the Bill of Rights, through the due 
process clause of the 14th amendment, was held to apply to the states as well as the 
Federal Government.  
 The case concerned Charles Gitlow, a socialist Senator from New York who 
was arrested in 1919 under the Criminal Anarchy Act of 1902 for advocating the 
overthrow of government by force or violence. The basis of the arrest was his 
pamphlet entitled Left Wing Manifesto that called the proletariat revolution an 
inevitable and praiseworthy event. The majority ruled in favor of the state, citing the 
traditional deferential approach that gave Legislature’s relatively expansive powers 
of regulation that “may only be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary 
or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the State in the public 
interest”. 68 Justice Holmes, however, joined by Justice Brandeis, dissented by 
arguing that there was a difference between the expression of a belief and a direct 
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incitement.  Without the existence of a direct call or earnest attempt to transform 
the idea into action, the state, in their eyes, did not have the authority to strip Gitlow 
of his right to free speech. Again, this understanding was firmly grounded in a belief 
in the need to uphold the an ideologically relative Marketplace of Ideas, as Justice 
Brandeis was willing to go so far as to say that “if in the long run the beliefs 
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant 
forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be 
given their chance and have their way”69 This quote in particular demonstrates the 
way in which the Marketplace of Ideas, by rejecting the concept of an absolute 
American ideology, gave previously condemned ideas a new degree of political 
legitimacy. 
 Two years later, the Court again found itself face to face with anti-subversion 
laws targeting leftist ideologies in Whitney v. California. While the court 
unanimously ruled to uphold the conviction, Justice Brandeis wrote a concurrence, 
joined by Justice Holmes, that explained that, although they affirmed the ruling 
against Whitney, they rejected much of the majority’s rationale. One of the key 
aspects of this concurrence is Justice Brandeis’ argument that based on the due 
process clause of the 14th amendment, “the right of free speech, the right to teach 
and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights”. 70 In labeling these 
rights fundamental, Justice Brandeis was placing them in the same category of 
protection as property rights, thereby establishing that the state needed more than 
a justifiable reason to restrict them: they needed to prove that speech would 
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produce an imminent danger to society. Furthermore, Justice Brandeis’ reiterated 
the need for incitement, rather than mere advocacy, to justify the censorship of 
opinions that Justice Holmes had laid out. Where Justice Brandeis went further, 
however, was arguing that the clear and present danger test, and the Marketplace of 
Ideas it was designed to protect, is an essential part of American Democracy. As he 
explains, “order cannot be secured merely through the fear of punishment for its 
infractions…fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces 
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies”. 71 This suggests that the Marketplace 
of Idea’s insistence on protecting individual speech regardless of the abstract 
ideologies allows political minorities the ability to address their grievances through 
the Democratic process. In doing so, it prevents the formation of dangerously un-
Democratic factions that would threaten the stability of the state as a whole. 
  As explained above, this increased openness does create the possibility for 
dangerous political ramifications. As Justice Brandeis explained in Whitney, “every 
denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that 
there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. 
Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of 
mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it 
still farther.”72 Despite this, he goes on to state that the risks such actions cause are 
simply the price of living in a Democratic society. In accepting the possible social 
and political repercussions of the Marketplace of Ideas, instead of simply sweeping 
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them under the rug, these decisions in affect changed the very concept of what it 
meant to be a citizen. Whereas for over a century the act of articulating an “un-
American” opinion was more than enough to justify a removal of that individual 
from the Democratic process, the Supreme Court, or at least these two Justices, were 
saying that these fears, although possibly warranted, had to be tolerated in order to 
increase the pool of ideas America draws on, thereby invigorating it’s decision 
making process. This willingness to accept individuals who had previously been 
deemed enemies of the state transforms the basis of American Democratic Identity 
from one that emphasizes loyalty and adherence to pre-existing traditions to a 
willingness to challenge, and in turn tolerate, new and sometimes offensive ideas. 
Far from rejecting foreignness, this concept embraces it. In doing so, these opinions 
shatter the very notion that there is a comprehensive American identity that needs 
to be protected at all costs. Instead, that identity, like the Government and society it 
reflects, is in constant flux.  
 While Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes were forced to lay this ideological 
groundwork through dissents and reluctant concurrences, the political and social 
changes brought about in the 1930’s provided them with an opportunity to turn 
their ideas into jurisprudential law. Most important amongst these changes was the 
remaking of the Court under Chief Justice Evan Hughes, who was appointed in 1930.  
Led by the progressive-minded Hughes, the Court began to put the Marketplace 
ideas the two Justices had been developing into practice almost immediately, with 
important free speech cases like Stromberg v. California, which protected the 
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substantive importance of symbolic speech, and Near v. Minnesota, 73 which 
overturned a law limiting the dissemination of “radical” newspapers. In 1937, in 
Hernden v. Lowry, the Court for the first time overturned a state sedition law on the 
basis of the Clear and Present danger test. Most importantly, however, was the 
realization of Justice Brandeis’ argument for the establishment of Free Speech as a 
fundamental right in Palko v. Connecticut. The decision, written by Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo, established that Free Speech is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom”. 74 In doing so, the Hughes Court had, in less 
than ten years, radically expanded the boundaries of what type of speech was 
protected under Free Speech.  
 The implications of these decisions on Democratic Identity cannot be 
overstated. For the first time in U.S. history, the state no longer had the legal 
authority to establish which ideas are radically un-American and which ideas are 
not. Strangely enough, the Court’s clearest articulation of this new American identity 
was given not in the reform-minded atmosphere of the New Deal, but in the 
fervently patriotic environment of World War II. The case, West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette, concerned the refusal, on religious grounds of Jehovah’s 
witnesses to salute the American flag. In direct repudiation of their decision in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis from a year earlier, the court ruled that a law 
compelling students to salute the flag violated the first amendment. As Justice 
Jackson explained, “if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
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nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith there in”75.   This fixed star, however, was born in a time of 
social upheaval, when the basic tenants of American traditions of economic 
individualism and limited State Government were being called into question. This 
created an environment that welcomed new and contrary ideologies, an 
environment that would be directly challenged in the polarized, hyper-patriotic 
environment of the Cold War.  
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History of the American Communist Movement 
 
1917 Russian Revolution, CPA Origins, and the First Red Scare 
   
  The Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) was not a collection of Soviet 
sponsored espionage agents, though many of its highest-ranking members were 
Soviet spies76. At it’s conception, as a representative of the Communist International 
newly born out of the 1917 Russian Revolution, it was part of a broader progressive 
movement in the United States reacting against the changes in American society 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Labor, suffrage, racial civil rights: all of 
these had strong affiliations with Communism. At the same time, however, “the 
newly organized American Communist movement was made up largely of 
immigrants, non-citizens, and non-English speakers, reinforcing the image of 
communism as a foreign import.”77 In this light, many saw Communism as an alien 
force inherently antagonistic to American culture, and in a way that was true.  
 While the roots of American Communism can be seen in the decades old 
labor movement, events overseas catalyzed the formation of the first American 
Communist Party. Specifically, the economic and political effects of World War I on 
the century old Euro-centric balance of power caused many leftists to claim, as the 
Left Wing of the American Socialist Party did, that “Capitalism, the prevailing system 
of society, is in the process of disintegration and collapse. Out of its vitals is 
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developing a new social order, the system of Communist Socialism”78.  The 
harbinger of this change: the newly born Soviet Union. To many progressives, the 
Bolsheviks represented Communist theory come to life, a group of devoted radicals 
who successfully toppled the mechanisms of Bourgeoisie society and were in the 
process of creating a proletariat Utopia. If it could be done in Russia, one of the 
cornerstones of the Global Political order, why couldn’t it happen in France? Or 
England? Or America? It was with this frame of mind that the American Communist 
Party was formed. The revolutionary goals were apparent from the beginning. As 
stated in the party constitution, its purpose was “the education and organization of 
the working class for the establishment of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the 
abolition of the Capitalist system and the establishment of the Communist Society”79 
In accordance with Communist ideology, this revolution was to be part of an 
international political revolution, and as such American Communists were more 
than willing to accept foreign influence. This aid, more often than not, came from the 
leaders of the Soviet Union, as they were the recognized leaders of the Communist 
International. 80 This influence was immediate, as demonstrated with the Zinoviev 
Letter in 1920. Written by Gregory Zinoviev, a close associate of Lenin, it 
reprimanded the American Communist movement for splitting into two separate 
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organizations, explaining in explicit terms “the Executive Committee categorically 
insists on this being immediately about.”81 Under this external pressure, the 
Communist Movement united under the Communist Party of America, (CPA) 
demonstrating the beginning the link between the American Communist movement 
and the Soviet Union that would define their relationship to American Politics. 
 This explicit between the CPA and the Soviet Union is part of a larger process 
by which the Party’s identity was, from the outset, directly connected in large part to 
foreign political developments. Fueled by Communism’s emphasis on breaking 
down national barriers in order to unite the workers of the world into a single 
proletariat force, 82 the CPA had little reservation in directly connecting itself to non-
U.S. interests. This is of particular importance to their relationship with government 
censorship because it situated them outside the general American citizenry. Their 
platforms, at least in part, was often times based on the interests of Communist 
countries around the world rather than strictly the American working class. In doing 
so, they in a sense invited the question that would fuel American anti-communist 
efforts: can a real American citizen place the needs of other countries above the 
needs of the U.S.? While such a simple question ignores the fact that the Communist 
Party saw their international-minded actions as a way of liberating the American 
working class, it does illustrate the pervasive sense amongst the American public 
that Communists were inherently political outsiders whose loyalty to the U.S. was 
suspect at best. 
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  The newly formed Party knew this foreign identity could undermine their 
efforts at political action, and they quickly realized that in order to have any tangible 
success in the U.S., they would have to embrace electoral politics to a degree that the 
more militant Communists of Russia was sternly against. Although the ultimate goal 
of creating a “proletariat dictatorship” was the same, they realized “the importance 
of election campaigns in developing the political consciousness of the working 
class”83 in the United States. In this way, the CPA was hoping to maintain its 
relationship with the larger Communist International while simultaneously 
embracing a distinct American identity by joining in on the U.S. democratic process. 
The immediate problem they faced, however, was the fact that following the end of 
World War I, the perceived threat of Communist subversion was beginning to 
become a nation-wide phenomenon. The First Red Scare had begun. 
 While American Leftist intellectuals and activists saw the Russian Revolution 
as the start of a new egalitarian global order, American conservatives, and indeed 
much of the American public, viewed it as a threat to traditional American society. 
The Soviet’s stern opposition to organized religion and rhetorical focus on the 
elimination of individual property rights in particularly went against some of the 
core aspects of American political thought.84 Furthermore, while foreign in nature, 
“in the United States too there seemed to be signs of radical upheaval”85. From 
police strikes in Boston to bombing campaigns targeting major financial and 
political figures like J.P Morgan and Attorney General Mitchell Palmer, all of which 
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explicitly had some ideological connection to certain Communist and Bolshevik 
organizations,86 many politicians and members of the public began to fear that 
Domestic Communists had already begun the process of dismantling America’s 
economic and political culture. It was in this environment that the state censorship 
apparatus developed by the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1917 in 
order to prevent anti-war efforts turned its attention to domestic Communism. 
Before it had even been formally created, the American Communist movement was 
already an enemy of the state in the eyes of the American Government. 
 This antagonistic relationship with American Communism reached its height 
with the Palmer Raids in early 1920. Organized by Attorney General Mitchell 
Palmer, with the help of a young J. Edgar Hoover, a series of raids were conducted in 
33 cities across the country targeting various Communist organizations in response 
to the aforementioned bombing campaigns. The raids were part of Attorney General 
Palmer’s attempt to completely remove from America any sentiment of 
Revolutionary Communist ideologies, and with this goal in mind more than 5,000 
individuals were arrested within 48 hours of the first raid. 87 Palmer justified the 
scope and speed of the operations, which entailed arrests without warrants, 
interrogations without lawyers and numerous other violations of civil liberties, as 
necessary in light of the existential danger these revolutionaries caused. Perhaps 
most revealing was Palmer’s keen interest in deporting many of those arrested, 
demonstrating the connection between anti-communist sentiments and an attempt 
to keep America pure of “foreign” ideologies. At first, much of the national and local 
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media accepted this explanation and applauded Palmer’s actions.88 This support 
was so great that Palmer, long suspected of having an interest in higher office, used 
it as a springboard to announce his candidacy for the 1920 Democratic Presidential 
Nomination before any of his challengers.  
 This support would be short lived, as soon the Palmer raids became a 
flashpoint for a national debate on civil rights. While the American left almost 
immediately came out against the Palmer Raids as a violation of individual civil 
liberties, it was not until the scope of these violations were made public that the 
critics of the raids gained broad support. Although legal challenges and media 
criticisms quickly increased, the most consequential aspect of this opposition was 
the decision by Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis Post to reject Palmer’s 
deportation requests. The ensuing conflict between Palmer and Post led to a 
Congressional hearing that, while punishing neither, disrupted the national view 
that the raids were necessary, instead framing them as a border-line totalitarian 
response to a threat that was more illusory than real.89 This view was reinforced by 
the relative failure of Communism to spread beyond the borders of Russia. Although 
it became increasingly clear that the Communist Government in Russia was here to 
stay, Communist movements in Germany, Hungary, Bavaria, Latvia and Finland 
failed to gain permanent traction.90 In this way, domestic violations of civil liberties, 
combined with international geopolitical developments that diminished the threat 
of Communist invasion less pervasive, made the paranoia of the Red Scare seem not 
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only unjust, but also unnecessary. This pattern would repeat itself over thirty years 
later in response to the second Red Scare. 
The Great Depression and New Opportunities 
 
 Despite the fact that Communism was no longer the singular target of 
Government censorship, the Communist Party of America remained a relatively 
marginal organization throughout the 1920’s. This was in large part due to the fact 
that “the economic crises, which had seemed so promising in the immediate 
aftermath of the Great War, had given way to booming prosperity, as the ‘second 
industrial revolution’ came into its own and Wall Street began its vertiginous climb 
beyond all limits”.91 With Capitalism seeming to be functioning better than ever, the 
Communist message failed to resonate with large segments of the population.  In 
light of these developments, there was a broader movement within International 
Communism to “shed their revolutionary image, take part in the bourgeois political 
process,”92 so as to order to influence working class politics despite the lack of a 
comprehensive proletariat consciousness. For American Communism, this meant 
integrating the still forming American Communist Party into the Third International 
along Bolshevik principles while simultaneously expanding their political 
connections to more moderate sectors of the American Left, like Socialist parties 
and labor unions. In doing so, the Communist Party hoped that they would be able to 
gain a degree of electoral and economic influence despite their relatively small 
numbers. This willingness to work with non-Communist organizations was key to 
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their early successes in organizing strikes for smaller labor groups like the United 
Textile Workers93. This limited scope would change, however, with the Great 
Depression. 
 With Capitalism in the throes of the type of crisis that Communists had long 
predicted, the American Communist Movement was able to expand its scope to 
previously impossible heights. From the success of the Communist-organized 
Unemployed Councils in effectively rallying jobless individuals to lobby for social 
security, cheap housing, and unemployment insurance,94 to the founding 
International Worker’s Organization in 1930, thereby challenging the existing 
profit-based insurance industry,95 the Communist movement developed the type of 
organizational structure and influence that allowed it to develop as a force in 
Depression-era politics. The key to this turn around was that the widespread 
poverty in America gave Communism a newfound relevance when addressing 
American audiences. Hoover, despite passing policies based on targeted government 
intervention, was defeated in the election of 1932 by FDR’s promise of a 
Government that would reign in the private practices that caused the economic 
collapse. The specter of an expansive Federal government regulating private 
industry, one of the cornerstones of American critiques of Communism, seemed less 
anti-American than in the economic boom years of the twenties. This was an 
essential step in the CPA’s development as a legitimate member of the American 
political community because it gave them ideological connections to existing 
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political organizations, in particular the Democratic Party. In doing so, it made their 
ideology, although still generally rejected, a legitimate part of America’s ideological 
spectrum rather than an alien outlier disconnected from U.S. political culture. 
The Popular Front 
 
 Although the economic challenges brought about by the Great Depression 
played a key role in legitimizing the CPA, it was actually the threat of German 
Fascism that allowed the American Communist Movement to reach to its political 
peak. The Soviet Union sought to shore up alliances with other countries to help 
contain Nazi Germany, so in 1935 they initiated the “Popular Front” program. It 
called for expanding the scope of Communist activity by reaching out to more 
moderate liberal groups, hoping “that unity of action be established between all 
sections of the working class, irrespective of what organization they belong to.” 96 
The CPA followed the Soviet’s lead, as they decided to join in the broad New Deal 
coalition under FDR 97 under a larger shift designed to show that, as Party secretary 
Earl Browder claimed, “Communism is the Americanism of the 20th century.” At the 
same time, however, this attempt to implant the Communist Party into American 
politics entailed a certain degree of separation from the Soviet Union. Only by doing 
so could the party be fully embraced as an American entity, something even the 
Soviet high command understood.98 In order to do so, the CPA began to actively 
emphasize its patriotism and the role it played in protecting American democracy. 
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Most strikingly, the party in 1939 broke with the Communist International with 
little controversy, beginning the shift towards a uniquely Americanized version of 
Communism.  
 By increasing the scope of political acceptance, the CPA not only reached 
70,000 members in 1939, but a majority of them were native born. Between the 
shift in ideological support of the U.S. and a growth in native-born members, the 
CPA had an opportunity to undo the widely perceived notion that the party was a 
“fifth column” of sorts. Across the country, Communist Party’s presented themselves 
not as irreconcilable radicals, but as the “left wing” of the New Deal coalition, and 
they subsequently gained powerful footholds in state-level government in New 
York, California, Minnesota, and Washington.99 Additionally, they became a 
dominant force in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), eventually gaining 
complete control of the United Electrical Workers. These successes indicate a 
continuation of the change in the way in which the Communists saw themselves and 
how Americans as a whole saw them that was initiated by the Great Depression. For 
the CPA, the Popular Front’s emphasis on ideological compromise allowed them to 
further integrate themselves within the American political system while 
simultaneously maintaining their Communist identity. Alternatively, this emphasis 
on participation with American society rather than active revolution against it 
diminished the sense amongst the American public that Communism was by 
definition antagonistic towards American ideals. In this environment, the idea of a 
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loyal American citizen who just so happened to be a Communist was becoming less 
and less far fetched.   
 The problem with this development is the fact that it was ultimately more 
dependent on the geopolitical relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
rather than ideological changes within Communism or American political culture. 
The Popular Front, for all of its ideological explanations, was based on the Soviet 
Union’s fear of the military might of Nazi Germany. This is part of the larger fact that 
for all the independence the CPA had, it was still in effect the American branch of the 
Third International controlled by the Soviet Union: The fact that the CPA waited 
until the Soviet Union gave them the authority to develop a distinct American 
political identity demonstrates for them to do just how pervasive the Soviet 
perspective was in defining the Party’s actions. The challenges this created for the 
CPA’s attempts to integrate themselves into American society were clearly 
demonstrated by the political fallout they faced after the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939.100  
This treaty, which refuted the basic tenants of the Popular Front, required a shift in 
the policy of the Soviet Union, and the American Communist Party followed the lead. 
As the Party quickly explained, between the Nazis trail of military conquest and the 
British and French policy of appeasement at the cost of Eastern European countries, 
the conflict was in reality “an imperialist war for the Bourgeoisie of all belligerent 
Powers”101.  Therefore, the only justified policy was non-aggression. When the U.S. 
actively declared war against the axis powers following Pearl Harbor, this policy 
                                                        
100 Ibid, 18 
101 Communist Party Political Committee, America and the International Situation, 
issued November 1939, Cited from Fried, 315 
 57
quickly cost them much of the political influence the Popular Front had given them. 
Losses at the state level across the country decimated their electoral influence, and 
even in the CIO, where Communist held some of the highest positions, the CPA’s 
anti-FDR platform would have led to their expulsion were it not for the actions of 
CIO president and long-time CPA ally John Lewis. The Soviet Union, after becoming a 
possible ally, had been transformed into the “Red Fascist”, as Communism becoming 
synonymous with Fascism in mainstream American Politics. Even President 
Roosevelt, the architect of the New Deal the CPUSA had spent nearly a decade 
supporting, reacted against this dissension, imprisoning Browder in 1941 for 
passport irregularities from a trip to the Soviet Union. Of more long-lasting 
importance was the passage of the Smith Act, which would eventually become the 
centerpiece of Government Communist censorship during the heights of the Cold 
War Red Scare.  
 This antagonism, however, completely reversed course on June 22nd, 1941, as 
Hitler violated the non-aggression pact and invaded the Soviet Union. Subsequently, 
the Soviet Union joined the British and the U.S. in declaring war against the Axis 
powers, and fear of the Red Fascists transformed into admiration for Uncle Joe. With 
the Soviet Union behind the war, the CPA returned to their Popular Front position of 
unity with the broader liberal wing of American Politics. In fact, the Soviet’s need for 
U.S. military assistance led the CPA to actively working with the military industry to 
maximize U.S. arms production. The Party was devoted to the mission of 
International Communism with the Soviet Union as the vanguard, and with this in 
mind, anything to help the American war effort was seen as a necessary action to 
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fight fascism and protect the future of the proletariat. 102 They even went as far as to 
suppress strikes in such arms factories. Despite the protests of Social Democrats and 
other union supporters, Earl Browder decidedly explained that Communism did not 
require the support of all strikes. 103 In times of war, Browder, and the CPA as a 
whole, claimed that labor strikes in key industries was too damaging to nationals 
security to be tolerated. This represented a marked shift in the policy of the 
Communist Party as they were now willing to go as far as to support the very 
Capitalist industries that they had for decades worked to undo. As the war went on, 
the CPA proved to be one of the most hawkish factions of American politics, giving 
them a degree of nationalist legitimacy they never had before.  
 The push behind the re-alignment of American perceptions of Communism, 
and Communist perceptions of America, were not borne solely out of military 
necessity. While this was the catalyst for the formation of this new relationship, the 
possible benefits of a continued alliance were not lost on the two powers. With the 
ideological differences that separated them momentarily pushed apart, the benefits 
of close relations seemed greater than the dangers of open hostility. In turn, each 
side made a number of moves intended to appease and deepen this bond. On the 
American side, FDR, partially out of fear of domestic subversion and partly out of a 
desire to keep American Communism in the hands of Soviet-aligned Stalinists, 
openly persecuted Trotskyites and other further-left members of the Communist 
movement.  
                                                        
102 Belknap, 37 
103 Browder, Earl, War or Peace With Russia?, 120 
 59
 From the other side, the Soviet Union disassembled the Communist 
International in 1943, thereby foregoing their symbolic mission of world revolution. 
Not only did this assuage the fears of some Western leaders, but it also created a 
sense in the CPA that the party, while still strongly connected to Stalinist principles 
and the needs of the Soviet Union, could make it a distinctly “American” party. There 
were no stronger proponents for this than CPUSA Earl Browder, the Kansas native 
who saw a post-war alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the greatest 
hope for the realization of Communism. This view, however, quickly became a 
serious liability as International politics once again forced a dramatic change in the 
American Communist movement.  
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The Red Scare 
 
Rise of the Cold War 
 
 As World War II came to a close, the military-alliance gave way to jockeying 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for division of Europe. The Soviet Union, 
looking to create a buffer between itself and Western Europe, sought to seize 
control of Eastern Europe. The U.S., on the other hand, sought to protect its own 
economic interests in the area while promoting Democratic governance in the newly 
liberated areas. This marked a new phase in the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. Before the rise of Nazi Germany, the two were antagonistic forces 
largely for ideological reasons: Americans feared the Soviets push for International 
Communism and the Soviet’s regarded the U.S. as stakeholders in the system of 
global Imperialism. After the war, however, with the two slowly realizing that they 
were now the world’s only superpowers, their ideological differences now coincided 
with diverging geo-political aims. This in turn led to drastic changes in the policies 
of both nations as they sought to do away with the ideology of cooperation in favor 
of one that would support their newly found roles as global competitors. 
 On the American side, President Truman committed early on to framing the 
growing conflict with the Soviet Union as a moralistic battle between Communism 
and Democracy.  Although President Roosevelt spent much of the war trying to 
develop an effective working relationship with Stalin, shortly before his death he 
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began to fear the Soviet’s ambitions in Eastern Europe and beyond.104 President 
Truman picked up these suspicions and quickly came to regard the Soviets as a 
serious threat to U.S. global interests. He also understood that America, a historically 
isolationist country, would not begin an all out conflict with the Soviets if they didn’t 
feel their conscience or their well being demanded it.105 With this in mind, Truman 
quickly began a popular campaign aimed at categorize the Soviets, and Communism 
as a whole, as direct enemies to freedom and democracy. As he explained to a Joint 
Session of Congress, “at the present moment in the world, nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life….one way of life is based upon the will of 
the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, 
free elections, guarantees of liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom 
from political oppression. The second way of life is based on the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed on the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms”106 This 
speech introduced the world to the Truman Doctrine, a policy based on supporting 
anti-communist governments and movements around the world.  
 This principle formed the backbone of what soon came to be known as 
Containment, a policy idea coined by U.S. diplomat George Kennan in 1946107. In 
essence, the policy rejected the principle of direct confrontation with Communism 
in favor of a focus on preventing its expansion in whatever ways possible. Kennan 
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believed that without increased access to new markets and political resources, the 
Soviet Union’s planned economic system would ultimately cause its own internal 
collapse. In order to facilitate this, the U.S. had to make sure that Communism did 
not gain political footholds around the world by whatever means necessary. The 
most significant manifestation of this policy in the early days of the Cold War was 
the Marshall Plan. Passed in 1948, the plan called for the U.S. to provide over $13 
billion in relief to Western European countries over four years in order to restore 
their economies after the internal devastation brought about by World War II. 
Although the U.S. had economic incentives for the plan, seeing as Western Europe 
was their largest trading partner, the underlying justification was a fear that the 
depressed economic conditions in these countries would create political 
opportunities for Communist movements. Soon this economic support turned into 
military partnership, as in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, 
was created as a way of setting up a cohesive defensive network against the threat 
of possible Soviet invasion. 
Focus on Domestic Communism 
 
 Although these policies were largely aimed at foreign countries, President 
Truman’s placement of the battle against Communism into moralistic rather than 
just strategic terms created a widespread domestic hostility towards Communist 
ideology as a whole. The Soviet Union and Communism became inseparable in the 
eyes of the American public and policy makers alike, and President Truman saw a 
political opportunity to shore up his anemic approval ratings by presenting himself 
as a strong defender of American democracy in the face of Communist expansion 
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around the world. 108 This need to strengthen his anti-Communist credentials, and 
the credentials of the Democratic Party as a whole, became more paramount 
following 1946 when the Republicans gained control of the House of 
Representatives. Soon Congressional Republicans began to not only criticize the 
foreign policies of the Truman Administration, but also directly call their loyalty into 
question by arguing that they were actively protecting domestic Communists. 109 
These claims, partially a response to the long-held hostilities in the Republican Party 
to the policies and administrative strength of the New Deal Coalition, 110 came to 
dominate the domestic political environment. Communism was no longer the far-
left wing of American politics as they were during the 1930’s, or even the hawkish 
patriots of the 1940’s, but seditious aliens forming a dangerous fifth column for an 
inevitable Soviet invasion.  
 This emphasis on the connection between domestic communism and foreign 
sabotage can clearly be seen in a number of policies Truman pushed through in 
1947, most notably executive order 98035, which created the Commission on 
Employee Loyalty. The Commission pioneered what would soon become one of the 
hallmarks of anti-Communist efforts in public and private institutions across the 
country: loyalty oaths. These oaths, although varying based on the organization 
requiring them, made “membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association 
with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or 
combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, 
                                                        
108 Belknap, 20 
109 Sabin, 28 
110 Belknap, 42 
 64
communist, or subversive….seeking to alter the form of government of the United 
States by unconstitutional means” grounds for dismissal. This loyalty program, 
which investigated over two million government employees, directly connected 
membership and sympathy with Communist parties to anti-Americanism, re-
institutionalizing the policy of treating communism as a foreign entity that the CPA 
had been working against for over a decade. This desire to isolate, control, and 
ultimately disassemble domestic Communist organizations was pursued to an even 
greater degree by House Republicans, as demonstrated by the Nixon-Mundt 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1948. The bill, which ultimately didn’t pass, 
would have made the Communist Party an illegal entity and required all members to 
register with the government their loyalty to foreign powers.111 This was not the 
sentiment of politically isolated, ideological bomb throwers: by April 1947, as Gallup 
polls indicate that 61% of Americans wanted to outlaw the CPA. 112 Communism, 
which only a few short years earlier was a powerful player in Democratic Party 
politics across the country, had suddenly become so foreign to American traditions 
that it had become a recognized enemy of the state. 
 This proliferation of domestic anti-communist laws was indicative not only 
of a growth in American’s embrace in the diametric opposition between 
Americanism and Communism, but also a sense that domestic communism 
represented a legitimate threat to the security of the United States. Despite the fact 
that the CPA at the time number less than 50,000 people, 10% of Americans 
believed they had enough strength to dominate American government, while 
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another 35% believed that they were in control of vital sectors of the economy and 
were getting stronger all the time.113 With the widespread fear of an inevitable 
World War III between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,114 the relative weakness of the 
CPA did little to assuage fears of their dangerous capabilities. In such an 
environment, domestic Communists were not fellow citizens but enemy combatants.  
 There are multiple reasons for this outsized fear of Communist subversion. 
One was the fact that Republicans quickly seized on the subversion issue as a way of 
undermining the Democratic Party’s anti-communist credentials. It cannot be 
forgotten, however, that Truman himself played a large part in creating the type of 
atmosphere that fostered this paranoia by justifying his foreign policy in terms that 
made Communism anywhere, including the U.S., an active opponent of American 
democracy. In doing so, Truman gave the Republicans a valuable tool that they could 
use to call into question the patriotism of any Democratic official. This would 
become one of the cornerstones of Republican attacks on Democrats until the 1952 
election when they gained controlled of the White House, most notably by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy. In effect, Truman’s declaration of an all out moralistic war on 
Communism wherever it sprung up, including the U.S., created an political arms race 
where Republicans and Democrats did everything they could do demonstrate their 
own patriotism while assailing that of their opponents across the aisle.  
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Changing Threats in a Bipolar World 
 
 Despite the importance of these domestic political battles in the rise of this 
national paranoia, developments abroad also played a key role in amplifying these 
fears. The first such moment was the removal of the Czechoslovakian government 
by a Communist revolution in 1948. 115 This was compounded by the formal 
collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s government in China and the formation of the 
Communist People’s Republic of China under Mao Zedong on October 1st, 1949. 
Overnight, almost a fifth of the world’s population had become Communist, and now 
the entire South Pacific region was ripe for Communist expansion. Journalists and 
politicians around the country were asking, “how we lost the East”.116 It seemed that 
Communism was on the march and that only an active American intervention would 
prevent the complete collapse of Democracy.  
 The fear these events inspired, however, paled in comparison to the Soviet’s 
first successful testing of an atomic bomb on August 29th, 1949. Not only did the this 
end the U.S. monopoly on such weapons, which previously guaranteed it overall 
military supremacy, but it also exponentially increased fears of domestic subversion 
due to the fact that the Soviet’s gained the U.S. guidelines from espionage efforts in 
England. 117 With this realization, America’s greatest fear was realized: the Soviet’s 
had an active network of spies that were able to infiltrate the highest levels of the 
Western governments. With this squarely in the minds of the American people, 
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Communist subversion became a serious threat to American security in the eyes of 
American voters and politicians alike. In this atmosphere, the separation between 
advocacy and incitement that Brandeis and Holmes articulated mattered little: with 
spies at every level and Communism on the move across the globe, Communism had 
to be completely eradicated in order to be stopped.  
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The American Communist Movement and the Red Scare 
 
The End of the Popular Front 
 
 Just as the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States after World War II led to an increase in U.S.-hostility towards domestic 
Communism, so too did it cause the CPA, and International Communism as a whole, 
to denounce the expansive ideological scope of the Popular Front. In the Cold War 
world, there was no room for political alliances with political moderates. 
Philosophically, this was a relatively easy maneuver to make: with German Fascism 
defeated, once again the greatest threat to the success of the proletariat revolution 
was the forces of Capitalist Imperialism. Politically, however, the shift would be 
much more problematic, particularly in the U.S., where the Popular Front had led 
the CPA to actively promote a new “Americanized” view of Communism that could 
work within Capitalism.  
 The most notable leader within this movement towards Americanized 
Communism was Earl Browder, the Party’s general secretary who saw a possible 
U.S.-Soviet alliance as the cornerstone of any peace in the post-war world. Although 
the war had ended, Browder still saw the maintenance of peace as the key to any 
political progress, arguing “any system of ideas which obstructs a durable peace has 
something basically wrong with it.”118 Committed to the broad ideological umbrella 
created by the Popular Front, Browder emphasized the need to “unite persons of the 
most diverse ideological views and interests”. This view, which had just a few years 
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earlier been the policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union due to 
wartime necessities, was no longer tenable. When the Soviet leadership commanded 
him to adopt their antagonistic, ideologically restrictive policy, he refused. Instead, 
he decided to dissolve the CPA and make it the Communist Political Association. By 
branding the organization as a political association rather than a party, Browder 
hoped to initiate his vision of Americanized Communism through political 
grassroots lobbying efforts rather than the confrontational, uncompromising stance 
the Soviets were pushing for.119 In effect, Browder was trying to further move away 
from a Internationally-defined Communist movement to one that could respond to 
changing political realities in the United States. By doing so, he initiated a chain of 
events that would drastically change the face of the party. 
  Soviet-style Communism, and particularly under Stalin, was based on a strict 
hierarchy. In this structure, leaders at various levels passed down political and 
philosophical edicts that had to be accepted by those lower than them, a result of the 
state’s emphasis on the scientific, absolute nature of Communist ideology.120 
Therefore, when Browder refused to follow his orders and continued to push for a 
U.S.-Soviet alliance, he went against one of the cardinal rules in the party. The 
response was swift: in April 1945, Jacques Duclos, a ranking member of the French 
Communist Party, wrote a piece chastising Browder for promoting expanded 
political influence rather than ideological purity.121 Re-published in the Daily 
Worker, one of the main American Communist publications, the letter signaled to 
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foreign and domestic critics of Browder’s policies that the Party leadership wanted 
the removal of Browder. Most notable of these attacks was from William Z. Foster, 
Browder’s long time intra-party rival. In a special convention in New York City of the 
CPA, Foster gave a blistering attack on Browder, accusing him of revisionism to 
Communist philosophy and denying that Browder had any role in the party’s 
successful wartime policies,122 the beginning of the movement’s internal debate 
over “Browderism”. In the ensuing months, more and more members, realizing the 
international and internal pressure being brought to bear on Browder, began to side 
with Foster and labeled the Secretary a dangerous revisionist. By June 18th of that 
same year, Browder’s fate had all but been decided, and on June 20th in a vote of 53 
to 1 by the National Party Committee, Browder was removed as secretary and 
replaced by Foster. Shortly thereafter, the Communist Political Association was re-
organized as the Communist Party of the United States of America, the CPUSA.  
 This was only the beginning of the ideological purge, however, as members 
were either removed for accusations of Browderist sympathies or came forth with 
apologies for their past transgressions against the party. Countless ranking officers 
of the party from around the country were called forth before the National 
Committee to testify on their collaboration with Browder, and time and time again 
individuals who had for years publicly supported Browder apologized for 
succumbing to his “opportunistic” and “revisionist” interpretation. Often their 
apologies centered on a sense of fear in defying him, a product of the cult of 
personality that Stalinist Communism emphasized in national leaders. As one 
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witness later stated, “grown-up men and women, none of them subject to physical 
compulsion and all of them free at any moment to walk forever out of the party 
headquarters, rose to beat their chests, to weep and grovel for having followed Earl 
Browder”.123 This internal crusade against Browderism exemplified one of the 
CPUSA’s tendencies that would play a major role in its decline and ultimate demise: 
a strict adherence to leadership and little tolerance for dissent. Long a party based 
on strict ideological unity, where ideological divisions were seen as an assault on 
traditional Marxist-Lenin principles, the post-war era saw this desire become an all-
consuming demand. As American-Soviet tensions increased, the Party’s growing 
antagonism with the American Government demanded that those within the party 
be absolutely committed to Soviet-style communism and totally reject the system of 
American Capitalism. This rather un-democratic internal identity would grow more 
pronounced as the Cold War developed, reaching its zenith during the party’s efforts 
to resist McCarthy-era attacks in the early and mid 1950’s.  
 These radical internal changes from the Browder administration to the 
Wallace administration quickly led to noticeable shifts in the party’s approach 
towards the U.S. government. Whereas the Daily Worker and other party-affiliated 
publications hailed President Truman as a defender of international progressivism 
in early 1945, by the end of the year he became “an indecisive figure tending to 
make certain concessions…to the reactionaries.” 124 Soon this condemnation of 
reactionary forces within American politics gave way to the Party’s proclamation 
that America, from top to bottom, was on the way to a fascist government along the 
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lines of Nazi Germany.125 This declaration, partly based on the Soviets need to 
rationalize their military hostility towards the U.S. along philosophical grounds, was 
a response to the growth of domestic anti-communist measures across the country. 
This “red-baiting”, as critics called the measures, was a particularly significant 
development to those in the Party because it demonstrated the Government’s active 
hostility towards Communist ideology. Between Soviet demands for ideological 
unity with the International Communist community and domestic repression at the 
hands of the state, the Communist Party quickly shifted from a willing member of 
the New Deal coalition to a fervent critic of both parties and the U.S. government as 
a whole.  
 The dizzying speed with which Browder went from adored Secretary to 
ideological traitor is yet another demonstration of the CPUSA’s insistence on 
emphasizing its Soviet rather than American identity. From a political perspective, 
Earl Browder was an ideal leader for Communism in the post-war world. Born in the 
heart of Kansas, much of his time as the General Secretary of the CPUSA was 
dedicated to proving that Communism was in fact coherent with traditional 
American principles. Such a stance, if adopted by the CPUSA, could have helped 
combat the ever-expanding sentiment that Communism, and Communists, were 
inherently foreigners hostile to U.S. culture. Instead, however, the Party accepted 
the signals sent by the Communist International and enacted a platform of open 
antagonism towards the United States government as a whole. Whether or not the 
members of the party had any real control in this matter is up for debate 
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considering how much funding the CPUSA received from the Soviet Union. What it 
does demonstrate, however, is that at the end of the day, the CPUSA placed more 
importance in aligning themselves with the policies of the Soviet Union than in 
developing a unique identity based on both Soviet and American interests. Indeed, 
the removal of Browder from office would eventually become a central tenant of the 
Federal Government’s attempt to demonstrate that the CPUSA was designed to 
subvert the U.S. government in the Dennis trials.126  
Taft-Harley Act and the Progressive Party of 1948 
 
 The tensions these changes created reached a breaking point in 1947 with 
the passage of the Taft-Harley Act. The law required, amongst other things, that all 
unions registered with the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) collective 
bargaining agents had to sign an affidavit swearing there were no Communists in 
their organization. If members of the party agreed to sign the affidavits, then they 
open themselves to be to perjury charges. Alternatively, if they resigned from their 
posts, they would lose their most critical power base, as their leadership in the CIO 
was the key to their political operations across the country.127 The idea of removing 
Communists from the ranks of industrial labor was based on a fear that they would 
initiate “political strikes” aimed at sabotaging the American economy rather than 
advancing the interests of the Union members.128 This represents a continued 
manifestation of the sense that Communists were inherently dangerous and could 
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not be trusted in affairs concerning American interests. As such, they had to be 
removed from the mechanisms of power and influence. As one historian stated, 
“Once outside the protection provided by mainstream labor and liberal institutions, 
American communists faced isolation and near annihilation.”129 By removing the 
Communists form the ranks of Big Labor, anti-Communists forces were trying to 
remove them from Americas economic and political life. The implication is clear: 
these are not citizens; these are dangerous foreign agents of Soviet sabotage that 
need to be stopped. 
 Initially, the CPUSA, although fearful of the consequences of the Taft-Harley 
Bill, were relatively confident that CIO president Philip Murray’s long-standing 
interest in organizational unity would keep him from embracing the bill and forcing 
the member unions to sign the affidavits. Despite the continual efforts of more 
conservative forces within the CIO, Murray was afraid to sacrifice the efficiency and 
national network the Communists had to offer.  In this vein, Murray ordered unions 
across the CIO to protest the Taft-Harley Act’s demands for affidavits.  
 This unity within organization was put under a great deal of strain, however, 
when some of the larger unions began to push out Communist members and sign 
the Taft-Harley affidavits on their own. In particular, Walter Reuther, the anti-
communist president of the United Auto Workers who had long been held in check 
by Communist allies on the UAW’s leadership board, removed his opponents from 
the Union in November 1947 and announced his intention to sign the Taft-Harley 
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Amendment.130 This development was part of a larger change within the CIO that 
called for allowing individual unions to determine independently whether or not to 
sign the Taft-Harley Amendment. Chairman Robert Denham of the NLRB’s echoed 
this sentiment, making Murray’s attempt to present a united front all the more 
difficult. This was a serious threat to the CPUSA’s strength in the CIO because their 
strategy had always depended on a control of national leadership rather than broad-
based support within the constituent unions. In light of the relatively small 
membership of the CPUSA, it was these close relationships with figures like Phillip 
Murray and former president John L. Lewis that allowed the Communist party to 
exert control over the actions of the Unions in the organization. With the leadership 
essentially cut off from each individual union’s decision-making process towards the 
Taft-Harley affidavits, the Communists were in serious danger of being pushed out 
of the CIO by changes in the rank and file.  
 With this outcome in mind, the CPUSA decided to break from the CIO and the 
Democratic Party as a whole and support the newly formed Progressive Party under 
Henry Wallace in his candidacy for president in 1948. This decision cemented their 
separation from the CIO because it directly countered the organization’s long-
standing support of the Democratic Party’s New Deal coalition. The Communists, 
seeing their power base in labor slowly fade away, now turned to popular politics in 
the hopes of maintaining their political relevancy. 
 Beyond the growing sense of isolation from the CIO, there were a number of 
other factors that drove the CPUSA to support the Progressive Party platform. One 
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of these was the continuing sense that the Democratic Party, which the Communist 
Party had supported from within for over a decade, was squeezing them out as the 
Red Scare picked up steam.  Exacerbated by foreign demands by the International 
Communist Commintern to distance themselves from the major parties in the 
U.S.131, the CPUSA began to sense that the only hope they had for influencing policy 
and the broader promotion of a proletariat consciousness in the U.S. was through a 
functioning political party that would allow them to independently insert their 
ideology into the political arena. With indications coming from the Commintern 
abroad that direct action was necessary in the face of growing suppression, the 
CPUSA felt this desire was in line with international Communist trends. 
Furthermore, the successes of independent candidates across the country in local 
and state elections gave the leadership of the CPUSA a sense that there was a 
political opportunity for them to establish an ideological foothold that would 
counter the rising tide of anti-communism in the country.  
 In terms of the CPUSA’s sense of attachment to the political system as 
citizens, the decision to forsake the institutional strength of the CIO in favor of the 
possibility of gaining a foothold in electoral politics is an interesting development. 
Anti-Communist measures were being adopted across the country, with large 
majorities in both major parties actively supporting these measures. Rather than 
pushing Communism out of the electoral process, however, these measures actually 
served to increase their association with it through the formation of their own 
national election-based party. New regulations akin to the Taft-Harley Act were 
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destroying the institutional power the CPUSA had depended on, and therefore they 
took it on themselves to challenge these policies head on by assembling a broad 
based coalition of active voters that could give the CPUSA direct influence over 
legislative affairs. Instead of working through either of the two parties, the CPUSA 
could directly design their own legislative agenda without fear of alienating more 
moderate political forces.132 At the same time, this decision was not made until it 
seemed clear that they would be squeezed out from the ranks of the CIO, and 
subsequently the Democratic Party. This seems to indicate that although the CPUSA 
believed their Party could seize on certain political opportunities for a third party 
candidate with a popular front runner like Wallace, in reality their push for the 
Progressive Party was more based on a sense of growing isolation form the existing 
political system. In this way, the decision to back the Progressive Party was a sort of 
acknowledgement by the CPUSA that unless they directly entered the world of 
electoral politics and thereby gain direct access to the functions of government, they 
would lose any real political influence. This plan, though fairly reasonable, had one 
flaw: Wallace was never entirely comfortable with the CPUSA’s role in the 
Progressive Party. 
 Henry Wallace, former vice-president under President Roosevelt, was a 
rising star in the American left. After he resigned as Secretary of the Treasury in 
1946 in protest of the Marshall Plan and the U.S.’s broader antagonism with the 
Soviet Union, Wallace began a series of speaking campaigns emphasizing the need 
for U.S.-Soviet partnership, particularly a widely popular tour through Europe 
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where he was happily greeted by millions of foreign supporters.133 Domestically, he 
was a strong supporter civil rights, refusing to speak at segregated events 10 years 
before Brown v. Board turned segregation into a political litmus test. Despite this, he 
was far from a fellow traveler. His critique of the Marshall Plan was less a Foster-
esque assault on U.S. Imperialism than a Browderist fear that such a policy would 
damage the possibilities of a U.S.-Soviet alliance. More importantly, however, 
Wallace was never entirely comfortable with the public support the Communists 
were giving his candidacy, hoping instead to have the discrete relationship that 
marked the party’s relationship to FDR. The Communists, however, were looking at 
the Progressive Party as their chance to publicly address the anti-Communist, anti-
Soviet policies and attitudes of the day. This dissonance created a division between 
Wallace’s inner circle and the CPUSA members who worked within the Progressive 
Party that undermined the efforts of the Party to fully utilize the networks each of 
these groups had to offer. 
 Furthermore, developments abroad exacerbated the divide between the 
Soviet Union and the U.S. to a degree that made the calls for peace and cooperation 
from the Progressive Party increasingly out of sync with the political mainstream. In 
particular, the ouster of Marshall Tito’s Yugoslavia from the Communist bloc for 
defying Soviet ideology and cooperating with non-Communists, combined with the 
Czechoslovakian Communist Party’s removal of their long standing non-Communist 
coalition partners, gave the impression that the Soviet Union was increasingly 
seeking to create the same type of ideological and political separation between 
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Communism and Western Powers as President Truman.134 Despite this, the 
Progressive Party, a coalition largely based on a rejection of the U.S.’s “tough talk” 
policy towards Communism, rejected the Vermont Resolution, which submitted an 
amendment to the Party Platform saying that “although we are critical of the 
present foreign policy of the United States, it is not our intention to give blanket 
endorsement to the foreign policy of any nation”135 The amendment was designed 
as a way to clarify the Party’s willingness to critique Soviet Union policies just as 
they critiqued the U.S.’s. To delegates at the convention, however, it represented the 
type of red-baiting that their campaign was designed to combat. The resolution was 
defeated, and the national press and politicians alike quickly branded the 
Progressive Party and the CPUSA organizations dedicated to the growth of the 
Soviet Union rather than real cooperation between the two Superpowers.136 This 
development not only doomed the Progressive Party’s electoral ambitions, but 
further strengthened the widely held notion that Communists as a whole were more 
Soviet than American.  
 The Progressive Party, far from integrating Communism into the political 
arena and demonstrating it’s broad support across the American population, failed 
to garner even a million votes in the 1948 election, falling far short of the 10 million 
many expected Wallace to earn in early 1947. However, despite the fact that the 
CPUSA was no longer protected by their connections to Labor and without an 
independent source of strength in either the legislature or the voting populace as a 
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whole, they were still determined to maintain their role as the American vanguard 
for the proletariat revolution. With their membership still intact, they saw the 
Progressive Party’s failure as more of a setback than a failed last stand. What they 
didn’t realize, however, was that soon the anti-Communist forces in Washington 
would crush what little structure and support they had left.  
  
 81
Dennis v. United States: A Tighter Marketplace 
 
The Supreme Court and the American Zeitgeist 
 
 Senator Joseph McCarthy has become the cultural symbol for the Red Scare, 
and for good reason. He was a central figure in anti-Communist politics of the era, 
helping to expand the paranoia to an unprecedented degree and set a new standard 
for political opportunism by combining alarming rhetoric with righteous 
indignation. With that being said, he was only part of the story. There were 
countless idealistic and opportunistic anti-communists that fueled the fires of 
paranoia. In a way, though, this was merely the extension of a long held pattern in 
American politics of what has been termed “pathological repression”, 137 which 
argues that America is predisposed to these forms of fervent repression in times of 
national paranoia concerning public security and national integrity. From this 
perspective, what is of greater importance is the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
uphold the various forms of censorship that this fear created.   
 At the close of World War II, as previously explained, it seemed that the 
Marketplace of Ideas established within the confines of the clear and present danger 
test put forth by Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes had become the accepted 
approach towards First Amendment Jurisprudence concerning political speech. 
With a developing strain of libertarian justices, the Supreme Court was increasingly 
expanding the boundaries of civil rights protection in areas like religious 
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expression138 and civil rights 139. The pathologized repression of the 1920’s red 
scare seemed impossible in the face of these increased protections. What these 
notions failed to account for, however, was that the Supreme Court was in the same 
Cold War environment as their elected counter-parts. 
 At the heart of this argument is the fact that the Supreme Court, far from an 
elevated institution removed from the realm of U.S. politics, is an ever-changing 
institution that reflects its times.140 This is not to suggest that the justices have been 
historically unable to analyze cases from a constitutional rather than political 
perspective, but rather that their decisions have been in some capacity based on the 
political situation in which they find themselves in. Nowhere is this clearer than in 
their handling of government censorship of domestic Communism. In an 
atmosphere when there was a very real sense of impending Soviet Invasion in the 
eyes of the public and many of the most influential and intellectually capable policy 
leaders, the newly minted Vinson Court by and large permitted the censorship of 
internal communism as a necessary part of the ongoing fight against the Soviet 
Union. The pro-censorship decisions of the Supreme Court, far from a rejection of 
the “clear and present” danger test, were based on a different interpretation of what 
constituted such a danger to the security of the United States. In their eyes, advocacy 
of a sort of Communism Revolution was just as dangerous as direct incitement of 
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such a revolution because the political circumstances at home and abroad made 
Communist revolution a real possibility if it was given time and space to develop.  
 Although the Supreme Court dealt with a number of anti-communist statutes, 
no law is more closely connected with this moment in American civil rights history 
than the Smith Act. Passed in 1940 as a way to control domestic groups sympathetic 
with Nazi Germany, the law stated “whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, 
advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or 
destroying the government of the United States….by force or violence….shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years.” Almost a verbatim 
reproduction of the Sedition Act of 1918, the bill became one of the cornerstones of 
the anti-Communist efforts. Although HUAC hearings on subversion and espionage 
dominated the newsreels, with figures like Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs stoking 
fears of Soviet incursion into every aspect of American life, it was the Smith Act that 
created the legal framework for the suppression of Communism as an ideology. The 
fact that it was originally designed to aid American war efforts is notable; as it 
demonstrates the way these anti-Communist efforts were situated within a 
framework based on national loyalty and national security. Therefore, by virtue of 
using the Smith Act as a means of Communist censorship, the Government was 
affirming their identity as foreign aligned enemy sympathizers. The Smith Act, 
therefore, forged the link between the geopolitical fears of Soviet militarism with 
the widespread ideological rejection of Communism. Without it, domestic 
Communism, although generally looked down upon, was yet another source of 
dissenting views.  
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 Despite the fact that the Smith Act is now synonymous with anti-
communism, it was not until almost 8 years after its ratification that it started to be 
used against the CPUSA. As President Truman and the Democrats sought to fend off 
Republican attacks on their anti-communist credentials, while simultaneously 
combatting Henry Wallace’s attacks on the growing “red-baiting” phenomenon, the 
Attorney General’s office quietly began to develop a Smith Act case against the 
CPUSA.141 When the case finally developed, the FBI and Department of Justice raided 
the New York headquarters of the CPUSA on July 20th, 1948, arresting William Z. 
Foster, Eugene Dennis, along with 3 other members of the Party’s National 
Committee. In the next month, another six party leaders would turn themselves in. 
The news of the arrests was met with praise from the conservative leaning The 
Chicago Tribune to liberal minded The New York Times, and it seemed to be a matter 
of time before the guilty verdict was returned. The CPUSA understood this and 
actively worked to prevent the trial by condemning the trial as an assault on 
democracy and pressure allied groups, such as labor unions and other leftist 
political organizations, to do the same.142 Despite these protests, and continual legal 
maneuvering by Party lawyers in an attempt to push back and possibly prevent a 
trial, the 11 members of the CPUSA national committee began their hearing on 
January 17th, 1949 in the U.S, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in lower 
Manhattan, and with that Dennis v. United States was underway.  
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A New Court and a New Approach   
 
 In order to understand the jurisprudential changes in the scope of the clear 
and present danger test, it is essential to realize that the Supreme Court of the Red 
Scare had a radically different approach to civil liberties from the court’s that came 
before it. Buttressed by the growth of a judicially conservative bloc consisting of 
three Truman appointees, Justices Clark, Burton, and Minton, along with the FDR 
appointed Justice Reed, the appointment of Chief Justice Fred Vinson by President 
Truman in 1946 created a court that emphasized deference to the legislative and 
executive branch in determining issues of national security.143 This deferential 
stature led them to determine that the dangers created by the Cold War demanded 
that state authority were paramount over individual liberties.144 In this capacity, the 
Court seemed to be returning to the security-minded decisions of the 1910’s and 
20’s that accepted the clear and present danger but largely interpreted advocacy of 
“dangerous” ideologies to constitute such a danger. Once again, domestic 
Communism’s connection to the Soviet Union led to a growing sense of fear that 
advocacy of Communism, rather than only incitement, represented a clear threat to 
American security. The main difference was that whereas the 1920’s Red Scare was 
based on a fear of a still burgeoning Soviet Union, the Red Scare of the 1950’s was 
based on a fear of a Soviet Union that rivaled the U.S. for global hegemony.  
 The first manifestation of this change in judicial perspective was the Court’s 
decision in American Communications (CIO) v. Douds. The case concerned the Taft-
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Harley Act’s requirement that Union’s affidavit’s affirming that there were no 
Communists in their ranks. While labor lawyers argued that the statute represented 
an undue restriction on individual’s speech by connecting their jobs to their political 
ideologies, the court ruled that it was constitutional for certain occupations to 
discriminate on the basis of ideology if that ideology could have a negative impact 
on the performance of the job itself. In this case, the threat of political strikes 
organized by Communists in order to cripple U.S. industry.145 As the majority stated, 
this decision was not about a desire to censor certain ideas out of a fear of their 
consequences, but instead based on the need to protect “the free flow of commerce 
from what Congress considers to be substantial evils.” This decision demonstrated a 
shift in the interpretation of the clear and present danger test by diminishing the 
importance of demonstrating active incitement that Justice Brandeis articulated in 
his Gitlow dissent. The mere possibility of politicized strikes, rather than the act of 
planning of them, was enough of a danger for the Court to affirm the laws 
constitutionality.  
 While Chief Justice Vinson’s decision highlighted the long-standing 
importance of the clear and present danger test, he made sure to explain that the 
test is not an absolute, universal law. As he explained, “the right of the public to be 
protected from evils of conduct, even though First Amendment rights of persons or 
groups are thereby in some manner infringed, has received frequent and consistent 
recognition by this court.” Citing cases ranging from barring unscheduled religious 
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or political parades that impede traffic146 to censorship to affirm communal 
standards of morality147, Vinson places an emphasis on elevating communal 
standards over certain individual rights. In doing so, Vinson’s subtle shift away from 
the clear and present danger test in some ways represents a much more 
consequential return to the deferential, “public good” conception of restrictions on 
individual speech that defined pre-Schenck Free Speech doctrine. The key difference, 
however, was the fact that in this case the Communists were not only voicing 
opinions, but also actively attempting to initiate actions that would have 
consequences on the American economy for political purposes. This raises an 
important question: how exactly did the Court view the CPUSA? 
 The general opinion of the Court, and of congress, concerning the nature of 
the CPUSA compared to other political groups was summed up quite nicely by 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence for the case. As he explains,  “Congress could 
rationally conclude that, behind its political party façade, the Communist Party is a 
conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to reach ends and to use methods 
which are incompatible with our constitutional system.” Just as importantly was 
Congress’ finding, which Justice Jackson agreed with, “is dominated and controlled 
by a foreign government….which, to the threat of civil disorder, adds the threat of 
betrayal into alien hands.” The implication is clear: the CPUSA, unlike other political 
parties, is directly aimed at dismantling the United States government in order to 
advance the interests of the Soviet Union. While the Court explicitly rejects the idea 
of categorically outlawing Communism, they do make a point of explaining that the 
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CPUSA’s ideological underpinnings and foreign connections make them a danger 
when given access to certain forms of economic or political influence. This rested on 
the idea that, as Justice Vinson explained, “that beliefs are springs to action,” a 
notion that in many ways rejects the distinction between advocacy and incitement 
that had become a defining part of the clear and present danger test up to the point. 
With this in mind, it was entirely warranted that such beliefs could reasonably be 
assumed to create a direct danger for the American community. In this way, the 
Court situated their decision within the clear and present danger test was in part by 
denying the legitimate citizenship of CPUSA members.  
 This decision also demonstrates the differing interpretations of the 
Marketplace of Ideas that were inherent in these decisions. As Justice Vinson 
explained in his decision, “speech may be fought with speech. Falsehoods and 
fallacies must be exposed, not suppressed….that is the command of the First 
Amendment.” The problem, however, was the possibility that allowing Communists 
to be a part of government-sanctioned organizations could put them in a position to 
initiate illegal, subversive actions. In this way, the marketplace was closed off to 
these individuals because their ideologies seem to suggest that they would use their 
positions in a way that would ultimately be dangerous to the overall structure of the 
state. In this way, the majority did not even see their actions as a censorship on 
speech: to them, the loyalty oaths were a way of preventing certain forms of action. 
In this way, the Marketplace of Ideas was a construct that needed to be protected 
from ideological radicals that could cause illegal actions ultimately damaging to that 
Marketplace 
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  Justice Black’s dissent, on the other hand, argues that the precedent 
established by the Court’s decision directly undermined the American system of free 
political discourse. By permitting the denial of access to the Marketplace of Ideas to 
certain groups because their ideologies supposedly predisposed them to commit 
illegal acts, the decision, as he argues, justifies the ability of the State to censor 
Democrats if Republicans testify they are a threat to national security and vice 
versa, thereby de-stabilizing the entire system of political exchange. In essence, by 
blurring the line between advocacy and action, the Court has created a system 
where individuals can be censored for whatever imagined crimes their opponents 
accuse them of being prone to. Furthermore, Justice Black argues that this decision 
would have a destructive impact on the viability of future minor parties, as they 
could now be censored for political reasons by deeming their ideologies actively 
dangerous to American security and stability. To Justice Jackson, by de-emphasizing 
the distinction between advocacy and incitement in determining what violates the 
clear and present danger test, the Court restricted the openness of the political 
system to ideological minorities. This push for a more open marketplace regulated 
by a more stringent interpretation of the clear and present danger test, however, 
was out of touch with the rest of the Court.  
Dennis v. United States  
 
 The trial, whose outcome was rarely in doubt from the start by either side, 
was more theatrical than legal. The CPUSA believed that the only hope of avoiding 
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imprisonment was through the intervention of mass protests.148 Therefore, their 
defense was based more on stalling tactics than actively refuting the veracity of the 
arrests. When this tactic proved inadequate, they instead turned to using the trial as 
a platform for expressing the Party’s general ideology, a long-standing practice 
within the party known as a “labor defense”.149 Rather than directly address the 
claims made by prosecution, this strategy centered on critiquing the entire 
American legal system according to Communist principles, often in the form of 
critiquing the economic class make up of the jury and elected representatives as a 
demonstration of the lack of working class control over the mechanisms of power. 
The prosecution, on the other hand, focused their efforts on demonstrating that the 
CPUSA, under the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, was as an illegal 
organization working towards the violent overthrow of the government. This 
argument was based on the idea that the Communist Party, reorganized in 1945 
after its brief stint as the more moderate Communist Political Association, 
constituted an organized effort to shift the party’s focus towards advocating and 
teaching the desirability of violent revolution in the United States. In order to prove 
these claims, the State attorney’s focused much of their case on the literature the 
Party prescribed, such as Marx and Engels The Communist Manifesto and Lenin’s 
State and Revolution. This was designed to demonstrate that the Communist 
ideology the party adhered to demanded violent revolution of its members.  
 The fact that much of the case centered on discussions of abstract Communist 
ideology, rather than the specific workings of the CPUSA, demonstrates the fact that 
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the case was in reality a trial of ideologies. This was not about what the CPUSA did 
or did not do: this was about who the CPUSA was. As such, it was no surprise to 
either side when the jury issued a guilty verdict on all counts. In response, the 
“Dennis Eleven”, as the defendants came to be known, immediately began to work 
on their appeals. Although they had little doubt these appeals would not overturn 
the guilty verdict, they went through in the hopes that the mass protests that failed 
to materialize in New York would come to their rescue in Washington. 
 In their appeal to the higher courts, however, the CPUSA moved away from 
their initial defense strategy based on a reiteration of Marxist-Leninist principles 
and instead sought to situate their trial squarely in the realm of American 
constitutionalism. In accordance with the Party’s growing emphasis on America’s 
march towards fascism, the Eleven asserted that the Smith Act was an assault on 
political speech, and therefore represented a clear attack on America’s legacy of free 
speech. While this argument ignored America’s history of speech repression, one the 
Communists were all too familiar with, it does demonstrate something of great 
importance: the CPUSA, despite the fact that they had become enemies of the state 
in the eyes of the state, still maintained a sense of connection to American 
government. They felt that the American Constitution entailed certain guarantees of 
political rights, but these rights had been ignored by what they viewed as fascist 
politicians. Unfortunately for them, however, the existential fears brought about by 
the Cold War fundamentally changed the way the Supreme Court viewed 
Communism’s placed in the world, and these changes were reflected in judicial 
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integration of the Soviet Union’s global expansion into their interpretation of the 
Smith Act.  
 The significance of the changing signals sent by the Supreme Court 
concerning the importance of direct incitement in proving a violation of the clear 
and present danger test were clearly seen in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Dennis upholding the prosecution of the CPUSA national committee. The 
decision was all the more demonstrative of the changes in U.S. Jurisprudence due to 
the fact that it was written by Justice Learned Hand, the author of the Masses 
decision in 1917 that helped initiate Justice Holmes development of the Clear and 
Present danger test two years alter in Schenck. Despite his longstanding history of 
support for the protection of individual liberties, Justice Hand felt that between the 
rising tide of Communist efforts around the globe 150 and the signals of support for 
anti-communist measures from the Supreme Court,151 the requirements for a 
balancing of national security and individual liberties demanded that the 
prosecution be upheld. Of particular note is his use of “judicial notice” as a way of 
affirming the fact of the global threat of Communism.152 This legal tool establishes 
the relevancy of certain political conditions to the case at hand, in this case the 
worldwide conflict between the Soviets and the Americans. In doing so, Justice Hand 
re-affirmed the Court’s placement of the debate over CPUSA leader’s Free Speech 
rights within the broader military-political conflict with the Soviet Union. 
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 When the case finally reached the Supreme Court, this concept of judicial 
notice was a cornerstone of the Court’s decision to uphold the state’s conviction. By 
focusing on the unique challenges facing the U.S. as a result of the Cold War, Chief 
Justice Vinson sought to distinguish the case at hand from the landmark cases in 
which Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes developed the clear and present danger 
test by explaining that “they were not confronted with any situation comparable to 
the instant one – the development of an apparatus designed and dedicated to the 
overthrow of the Government” As such, the Court had to balance the protections the 
Court had developed with the increasingly alarming security needs the country 
faced. In light of the active expansion of Communism, from Czechoslovakia to China 
to Korea, the Court felt that the clear and present danger test did not require the 
court “to wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and 
the signal is awaited. If government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is 
attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby 
they will strike when leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the 
Government is required.” This represented a clear break from the 1930’s and 40’s 
court’s understanding of the clear and present danger test because it equated 
advocacy with incitement. As Vinson argued, there was no substantial difference 
between the two in the case of the CPUSA because advocacy naturally depended on 
the party’s willingness to take part in a non-democratic revolution in the name of 
Communism. With this link established, it was only logical for the State to put down 
these sentiments before they were able to grow to a strong enough degree that they 
could put their intents to work. 
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 That is not to suggest that the court simply paid lip service to the existing 
doctrine while creating an entirely new one. From the very outset of the decision, 
Chief Justice Vinson immediately accepts that Schenck and the subsequent decisions 
in the 1920’s formed the backbone of modern Free Speech jurisprudence.  With this 
in mind, the Chief Justice expands upon his decision in Douds that the Court’s new 
approach to censorship, far from going against these existing frameworks, was the 
only possible means of giving them the necessary flexibility to adapt to social and 
political changes. Nowhere is this connection clearer than in the Chief Justice’s use 
of the Marketplace of Ideas construct as a guiding principle behind the decision. As 
he explains, “the basis of the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can 
rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in 
the wisest governmental policies”. The problem, however, was that Communism, as 
a foreign born organization advocating undemocratic means of change, threatened 
the national security that was necessary for the continued existence of any coherent 
Marketplace of Ideas. 
 Of particular importance to this connection is the close association the Court 
established between the CPUSA and the Soviet-aligned Communist community. In 
order to do so, the Court actively, and correctly, connects the dissolution of the CPA 
and the reformation of the CPUSA with changes in “the policies of the 
association…from peaceful cooperation with the United States and its economic and 
political structure to a policy which had existed before the United States and the 
Soviet Union were fighting, namely, a policy which worked for the overthrow of the 
Government by force and violence” In citing the link between the changes in the 
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Party’s structure to the changes in the Soviet’s policy towards the United States, the 
Court touched upon the key question of the case: if a domestic organization actively 
connects itself to a foreign entity that is an avowed enemy of the United States, is it 
justifiable for the government to remove that group from the process through 
ideological censorship? The Court’s answer: yes. The CPUSA’s guilt was not solely 
based on the fact that they were promoting undemocratic means of change, but 
rather that they were promoting these means of change in accordance with a foreign 
power that the U.S. was actively in conflict with. This is built on an understanding 
that, as Justice Jackson said in his concurrence in Douds, “in each country that the 
Communists have seized control, they have so denationalized the foreign policy as 
to make it a satellite and vassal of the Soviet Union and enforce a domestic policy in 
complete conformity with the Soviet Pattern.” From this perspective, it is clear why 
the revolutions around the world justified the illegalization of the CPUSA despite the 
fact that the power and influence American Communists paled in comparison to 
their peers in Korea, China, Czechoslovakia, and other countries affected by 
Communists Revolutions: The CPUSA, although relatively small, was still a part of 
this undemocratic, anti-American network, and as such they were a foreign threat 
that endangered American Democracy. This demonstrates the fact that, while the 
embrace of advocacy as clear and present danger is an important part of the Vinson 
Court’s reinterpretation of Free Speech doctrine, this shift was based on a larger 
embrace of certain ideological boundaries for the Marketplace of Ideas based on 
who was a citizen and who was not. 
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Political Impact of Dennis 
 
 Not only was the decision in Dennis met with a predictable degree of public 
fanfare, but more importantly, Chief Justice Vinson’s expansion of what constituted 
a clear and Present danger on the grounds that Communism represented a clear 
threat due to the ongoing Cold War was warmly embraced by the public at large. As 
the Los Angeles Times reported, “A time may come again when a Communist will be 
a harmless member of a political splinter party… But that time is not now or in the 
foreseeable future. We are fighting Communists with blood and money on both sides 
of the world; now the Supreme Court permits us to fight it at home”153. With the 
Korean War raging overseas, the American public seemed ready to embrace the 
restrictions on civil liberties as a necessary cost of war. This belief that the Dennis 
decision was part of the ongoing fight against Communism abroad and at home was 
echoed around the country. For the Department of Justice, it was a green light that 
gave them the legal go-ahead to arrest dozens of supposed Communist leaders 
around the country.154 These events immediately became pubic affairs, as 
Newspapers began publishing “box scores” for how many Communists had been 
arrested in the previous days or weeks. In the ensuing years, with politicians like 
Senator McCarthy continually attacking the Truman and then Eisenhower 
administration on perceived weaknesses in dealing with domestic communism, 
arrests under the Smith Act became the easy and definitive way to demonstrate to 
constituents and political opponents one’s anti-communist credentials. One law 
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relating to the Smith Act, in particular, demonstrates the new degree of acceptance 
for anti-communist measures that would have been unthinkable before Dennis. 
Known as the Expatriation Act and passed in 1954, it mandated that any individual 
prosecuted under the Smith Act would immediately lose their citizenship. Similar 
bills were proposed by then Congressman Nixon in 1946 and 1947 calling for the 
deportation of all accused communists, but it was rebuffed as extreme and 
unnecessary.155 With a Republican in the White House and the public squarely 
behind the effort, however, now it seemed like the logical next step in the American 
war on communism. By stripping all convicted communists of their citizenship, the 
law made official what Dennis and years of Red Scare rhetoric had been trying to 
demonstrate: no true American could ever be a communist, and any communist was 
no true American. 
 By and large, the trials were largely decided before they ever came in: of the 
126 individuals arrested for violating the Smith Act, only 10 were acquitted.  As the 
Supreme Court had essentially ruled that supporting Communism in and of itself 
represented a threat to the State, evidence could be replicated from case to case. All 
that was needed was to first prove the individual was in the CPUSA and then read a 
few passages from Marx or Lenin and the case would be closed. For local politicians, 
it was a chance to extend the reach of the Red Scare to a variety of public fields. One 
such example was the New York School Systems decision to require loyalty oaths for 
all teachers. This decision was directly linked to Dennis, as the Superintendent of the 
New York schools explained in the wake of the decision that “The nation’s highest 
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court has held that the Communist Party is a criminal conspiracy against the United 
States of America. That is what we contended in the trial of the eight teachers. “156 
By ruling against the CPUSA, the Court had done much more than uphold the 
constitutionality: it had affirmed in the minds of Americans big and small that the 
CPUSA, and Communism as a whole, was a dangerous conspiracy that had no place 
in American politics or American life. 
 One of the often-overlooked effects of the Dennis trial was the effect the 
Court’s decision had on the willingness of liberal-minded lawyers to defend 
Communists from future Smith Act trials. The key to this was the fact that in the 
initial trial, Justice Medina, who was openly hostile to the CPUSA defendants, 
eventually held the CPUSA’s entire legal team in contempt of court for pleading the 
fifth instead of testifying and, in the eyes of Judge Medina, making a mockery of the 
court with their propagandistic efforts. But this alone would have only been 
demonstrative of the Judge’s bias, if it weren’t for the fact that he immediately 
sentenced the lawyers without a trial. These acts, which directly undermined the 
judge-lawyer relationship that is essential to effective courtroom proceedings, were 
upheld by the Vinson court in the Dennis decision as a justifiable response to the 
defendant’s “provocative” actions in the court, such as frequent objections and 
theoretical-grounded defenses. In doing so, the Dennis decision legally condoned the 
trend of persecuting the lawyers who defended communists along with their clients. 
Organizations such as the National Lawyers Guild, the Civil Rights Congress, and the 
Bail fund, all of which provided funding to legal defenses for Communists tried 
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under the Smith Act, were all placed on the Subversive Organizations List and 
quickly cut off from state and private funding. Furthermore, the American Bar 
Association recommended that all Communists and advocates of Marxist-Leninism 
be expelled from the practice of law, demonstrating the extent to which the legal 
community embraced these Cold War era restrictions.157 Without access to legal 
defense, Communists, already fighting an uphill battle, were left with almost no 
legitimate chance to fight off accusations once made.    
Public Opinion and Communism 
 
 While these examples clearly demonstrate the legal and political 
ramifications of the Dennis trial and the associated Red Scare policies, they only 
provide part of the picture. One key aspect that has only been indirectly alluded to is  
the effect these decisions, and the Red Scare as a whole, had on public opinion. 
While clearly connected to the policies and rhetoric that is supported in 
Washington, these only provide indirect clues. Luckily, this same thought occurred 
to sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer, a pioneer in sociological survey techniques who in 
1954 surveyed over 6,000 American citizens concerning their attitudes towards 
Communism and conformity as a whole. In doing so, he provides an in-depth picture 
of the individual and social atmosphere of the Red Scare  
 One trend that Stouffer’s data confirms is the uptick in anti-communist 
sentiments in the wake of the Cold War: between 1945 and 1953, the percentage of 
college-educated peoples who would deny Communists the right to Free Speech 
increased from 31% to 71%, while the percentage amongst non-college educated 
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people increased from 42% to 78%. Furthermore, at the time of this study, 80% of 
respondents stated that an admitted Communist should lose his or her citizenship, 
while 52% said they should be put in jail. Along with this, Stouffer also focuses on 
the changes in people’s general opinions on dissent. In doing so, Stouffer measures 
not only the change in anti-communist sentiment in the cold war, but also the larger 
changes in the perception of non-conformity as a whole. This is of particular 
importance because it demonstrates a change in the notions of what constitutes 
legitimate democratic action, and by extension what constitutes a legitimate 
democratic citizen. As is made clear by his data, the perception of dissent in the U.S. 
had drastically worsened between World War II to 1953. This can be seen in a 
number of different survey results, such as the fact that the percent of people who 
supported the right of the government to deny Socialists the right to publish 
increased from 25% to 45%. While this is the largest such jump in this category, it is 
far from the only one. When the question is broadened to encompass all 
newspapers’ not just Socialist sources, right to criticize our form of government, the 
percent supporting a government ban grew from 30% to 42%. At the root of this 
question is a concept of how limited, or unlimited, free speech is, and Stouffer goes 
on to show that whereas 32% of respondents opposed unlimited speech before 
World War II, 42% opposed it by 1953.  
 These findings raise an important question: why has the perception of 
dissent worsened so significantly in this 13-year period? One possible answer that 
Stouffer provides is that dissent is perceived to be particularly dangerous because it 
can rapidly spread. The clearest illustration of this is that when asked what people 
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fear in Communists, a full 28% stated that they were most concerned with the 
spreading of Communist ideas into the general population. While sabotage and 
Espionage were represented, with 8% for each, this fear of conversion had a clear 
plurality amongst those respondents. This fear took many forms, but mostly it was 
articulated through the respondents’ sense that Communists were agitating political 
and ethnic minorities, like industrial workers and African Americans, while 
simultaneously infiltrating the school system and developing communist sentiments 
in their children. At first this may seem confusing: how can the threat of ideas be 
more wide-spread than the threat of direct action, especially at a time when the 
Rosenberg’s’ espionage trial had made the threat of Soviet spies a frightening reality 
to millions of Americans? The answer lies in the fact that the American Red Scare 
was not a war on a dangerous organization trying to actively subvert the American 
government, but an attack on an ideology that critiqued the entire American way of 
life.  While espionage was a serious concern for Americans, one that Soviet reports 
released following the Cold War demonstrate was in many ways legitimate, 158 the 
true target of the Cold War was Communist ideology, not Communist action.  
 In demonstrating the tendency towards an ideological rather than security-
based explanation for anti-communism, this data also demonstrates that the Red 
Scare created an atmosphere that completely rejected Communism in every facet of 
American life. One series of questions that Stouffer employs that demonstrate this is 
concerning whether or not individuals believe avowed Communists should be fired 
from certain jobs. Stouffer separates these questions into two types of jobs: 
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sensitive and non-sensitive jobs. Sensitive jobs, like working in a defense plant and 
teaching in a high school or college, relate directly to fears of Communist sabotage 
and cultural infiltration. Non-sensitive jobs on the other hand, like radio singers or 
store clerks, are not connected, at least explicitly, to such concerns. As can be 
expected, there is a marked difference between the number of respondents who 
think an admitted Communist should be fired from a sensitive job versus a non-
sensitive job, with over 90% supporting firing individuals from defense plants or 
teaching positions. Despite this increased support for firing Communists in sensitive 
jobs, the degree to which individuals believed communists should be fired form non-
sensitive jobs still formed an overwhelming majority, with 68% saying Communist 
store clerks should be fired while 64% said that Communist radio singers should be 
fired. While this increased degree of disapproval for Communists having sensitive 
jobs rather than non-sensitive jobs indicates a degree of acceptance of Communism 
if it wasn’t in a field related to certain national interests like security or education, 
the fact that over a majority of the respondents held that Communism should not be 
hired to positions where Communism would likely have little or no impact on the 
job performed demonstrates a desire to expunge Communism as a whole from 
American Society. The problem, therefore, is not simply that Communists may 
sabotage our military might and national security, but that Communism may 
become a part of the American community. From this perspective, even if a 
relatively large Communist minority, or even a strong majority, were eventually 
formed in America, Communism would still be unacceptable because it is 
fundamentally against basic American values.  
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The Fall of the CPUSA 
 
The Party Contracts 
 
 With these increasing hostilities swarming, and government persecution 
reaching new heights each year, the CPUSA began to show the first signs of collapse 
shortly following the initial arrest of the Dennis Eleven. A key part of this 
organizational downfall was the CPUSA leadership’s decision to close ranks and 
promote a more disciplined membership.  This emphasis manifested itself into 
persecution based on either inadequate ideological purity or party loyalty.159 While 
these two were often connected, with individuals lacking Marxist-Leninist 
credentials quickly seen as party dissidents, they were really reactions to two 
different developments. The focus on loyalty was in large part a response to the 
fears of government-sponsored espionage into the ranks of the CPUSA, a well-
documented FBI practice that was so widespread that J. Edgar Hoover once stated 
that there were more FBI agents in the CPUSA than communists.160 The most 
noticeable example of this was the removal of Anna Louise from the ranks of the 
party. Once a noted intellectual figure with connections to a variety of influential 
Washington offices, in 1949 Soviet officials declared her an American spy and, 
without a word of protest from the CPUSA, she was immediately cut off from all 
Communist Party activities. These purges often actively supported the anti-
communist efforts they were meant to defeat, as demonstrated by the case of John 
Lautner, a long-time ranking member of the New York Communist party who had 
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served in the O.S.S. during World War II.161 As accusations of treachery emerged 
from Soviet sources, he was quickly removed from the party. In response, he began 
to become one of the most frequently used witnesses in Smith Act trials around the 
country. By looking to strengthen the party by removing government informants, 
the CPUSA had inadvertently made one.   
 This emphasis on party discipline, however, was a lesser priority to the goal 
of establishing an ideologically pure membership. As Eugene Dennis said shortly 
before he was sent to jail in 1951, “we must safeguard the purity of Marxist 
Leninism. We must wage war against all deviations, be they right or left 
opportunism, whether they are manifested in our trade union work, in our election 
campaigns, in the fight for Negro rights, in national group work, or in any other field 
of our mass activities”162 Rather than looking to increase their influence through an 
expansion of their ideological boundaries as they did with the Popular Front in 
1935, the CPUSA now sought to close ranks and maintain ideology unity at all costs. 
It was this drive for ideological purity that the crusade against “white chauvinism” 
into a central part of the party’s platform. Based on an attempt to expand their 
influence within the African American community, the party began to purge 
themselves of any vestiges of white privilege, from the activities they took part in to 
the language they employed. Trials against individuals who used terms like 
“whitewash” and “black sheep” became commonplace, and soon party officials were 
called before tribunals to apologize for racist language used in cultural texts from 
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decades before.163 This isn’t meant to suggest that an attempt to do away with 
“white chauvinism” in language and culture isn’t important: indeed, this movement 
helped spur the creation of militant, black nationalist movements that formed and 
continue to form an important core of the Civil Rights movement. Considering the 
hostile political atmosphere the party was in, however, their focus on a crusade 
against linguistic racism is one example of the party’s emphasis on ideological unity 
rather than political expediency. 
 This ideological unity, however, was not only based on a desire for the CPUSA 
to create a lean, mean proletariat machine in the face of increasing American 
attacks: it was also a part of a global movement within the Communist party to 
prevent the formation of another Marshall Tito. Tito, the leader of the Yugoslavian 
Communist Party, openly broke with Stalin and the International Communist 
Community in 1949 in order to pursue a more Yugoslavia-specific policy platform. 
This was the first major defection within the Soviet Communist International and it 
shook the confidence of the movement’s unity that was fundamental to its global 
aspirations. It was this unity that the Party was seeking to maintain through its 
emphasis on ideological and political unity, and in doing so the CPUSA continued to 
alienate itself from its American audience through the adherence to foreign dictates. 
In doing so, the Party began to increasingly embrace the foreign identity that had 
been imposed on it for decades.  
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The CPUSA and the Soviet Union 
 
 While this adherence to Soviet demands was nothing new, especially in the 
wake of the anti-Browderist crusade that sought to remove any attempts to create a 
more “Americanized” political association, it took on new dimensions as the Red 
Scare deepened. By refusing to distinguish themselves in any capacity from the 
Communist Parties abroad, in particular those taking part in active military action 
against various Democratic and un-democratic governments in Asia and Eastern 
Europe, the CPUSA made its attempts to proving its non-violent nature all the more 
challenging when brought before American courts.  This shift to a totally Soviet-
minded perspective was at the core of the Browderist purge and the refusal to pass 
the Vermont Resolution at the 1948 Progressive Party National convention: in both 
cases, instead of taking a more balanced perspective that would be willing to place 
critique both the United States and the Soviet Union, the party instead chose to wipe 
away any criticism of the Soviet Union as unwarranted red-baiting. This urge 
became all the more present as anti-Communism became more prominent in 
American politics, particularly following 1948, when the Soviet Union made it’s first 
direct communications with the CPUSA leadership since before the war.164 In 
shifting their focus party identity from one based on an American interpretation of 
the Communist mission, as had been the case during the New Deal and World War 
II, to the International Communist movement, the party in a way embraced a 
departure from the American Democratic community.  
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 Another manifestation of this insistence on an international, rather than 
American, party identity was the way in which the party defended itself in the Smith 
ACT trials. From the very beginning, the focus of the party was not on defending the 
Party’s actions in terms of First Amendment protections, but instead based on the 
efficacy of Marxist-Leninism. In doing so, they presented a defense based not the 
efficacy of the American government, but instead one based on an ideology defined 
by international actors. As John Gates, one of the Dennis Eleven, explained in his 
reflection on the trial, “it is clear now that instead of becoming involved in doctrinal 
disputes which nobody could understand, we should have concentrated on the civil 
liberties aspects of the case: the right to read, write, say and think any political 
thought we pleased – as set forth as a sacred right in the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution”.165 By seeking to defend doctrine instead of American 
conceptions civil liberties, the Party demonstrated their refusal to embrace an 
American identity in favor of one based on unity with the International Communist 
community.  The clearest manifestation of this, however, was the fateful decision in 
1951 to go underground. 
To the Underground 
 
 The decision to put much of the Party’s organization underground, which in 
effect affirmed the CPUSA’s status as an illegal entity, was precipitated by the Party’s 
fear of an increased degree of government persecution. These fears were first 
articulated in 1947, when former assistant attorney general and Labor party 
member O. John Rogge stated that “a dramatic round up of dozens of Communist 
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leaders and alleged fellow-travelers” was being planned166. When the arrests finally 
came in the form of the Dennis trial, there was a widespread sense within the 
Communist Party that this was only the beginning of what they saw as America’s 
inevitable road towards fascism.167 This fear was greatly exacerbated by the 
ratification of the McCarran Act in 1950, which directly labeled the party as a 
“foreign agent”.168 A sense of panic dominated the party as a fear that the Dennis 
arrests were to be replicated on a nation-wide level, all but dismantling the 
Communist party. Ultimately, on July 4th 1951, when the Supreme Court upheld the 
Dennis arrests on the last day of their session, several of the convicted failed to show 
up for their arrests. In doing so, they sent a message to the rest of the party that it 
was finally time to go completely underground, and soon dozens of leading CPUSA 
officials were sent abroad or into hiding. From there, they would maintain the 
disciplined vanguard that would wait for the opportunity to realize communism in 
America. In doing so, the Communists accepted that they no longer had legitimate 
access to the American political world. It seemed that the American anti-communist 
efforts had succeeded in pushing the CPUSA out of American politics, pushing them 
further and further into the hands of the International Communist Community. This 
complete embrace of Soviet leadership, and the subsequent attempt to create a 
Soviet identity within the party, ultimately led to the single most devastating 
moment in the CPUSA’s history: Nikita Kruschev’s denouncement of Stalinism at the 
20th Party Congress in 1956.  
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Kruschev and the Cult of Stalin 
 
 The speech was very clear: Stalin was a tyrant, and the “cult of personality” 
he built around himself was contrary to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. As Kruschev put 
it “Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient cooperation with 
people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his 
opinion”.169 By his own admission, Stalin’s rule was one of absolute tyranny, and the 
tyranny infected every aspect of the party as loyal members, like Krushcev, stood by 
and watched. In denouncing Stalin’s rule so harshly, and so absolutely, it completely 
separated itself from much of the way in which the International Communist Party 
had been designed. This event, which marked the beginning of the relatively stable 
détente years, was the death-knell for the CPUSA as it was designed, a complete 
affirmation of some of the most egregious crimes anti-communist critics had laid 
against the Soviet Union that they had for decades denounced. Ever since the rise of 
Stalin in the late 1920’s rumors of his human rights violations and politically 
motivated purges had become commonplace but, in accordance with Soviet 
Communism’s emphasis on the dynamic power of individual leaders and absolute 
loyalty of the rank and file, American Communists flatly rejected these stories as 
Imperialists propaganda.170 To these people, Stalin represented the hope for a 
utopian society, and they had followed his word as scientific law no matter what he 
did. When the feud between Stalin and Trotsky led to Trotsky’s exile, the CPUSA 
made a point of removing form their ranks any remaining Trotskyites offering 
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continued criticism of Stalin’s authoritarian rule, a crusade that continued for as 
long as the Party existed. 171 When these accusations ended up being true, the 
CPUSA members who had carried out these purges felt the most anger, as one 
member put it, “not with the Russians or Foster or even Stalin, but with myself and 
others who had been so blind in our adherence to Soviet policy and so mechanical in 
our application.”172 The CPUSA had put their faith in Stalin’s Soviet Union, a faith 
that ultimately proved misplaced. 
 The shock was palpable in the American Communist Community, as long 
time party loyalists had to loom inward and determine whether the cause they had 
been working towards was worthwhile.  At a time when the price for being a 
Communist, it hardly seemed worth it the CPUSA was in support of a tyrannical 
government. By completely connecting their identity to the identity of the 
International Communist Party, instead of forming a more Americanized Political 
Association as Browder envisioned, the CPUSA put themselves in a position where 
their policies were, in a very real sense, foreign policies. They had embraced a non-
domestic political ideology, and in the end it crippled their response to Cold War 
realities of persecution on both sides. 
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Signs of Change 
 
1953 and Détente   
 
 Krushev’s condemnation of Stalinism was part of the Cold War’s transition to 
the détente period. American fears of Communism, as Stouffer’s surveys showed, 
were still there. But at the same time, his studies also show a sign that there were 
institutional changes in the way the Communist threat was being perceived. In 
particular, his surveys showed that Community leaders, such as elected officials and 
the heads of various private political organizations like labor parties and activist 
groups, were in general more tolerant of Communist activity in their area. Returning 
to the question of firing Communists from “non-sensitive” positions, in which more 
than 64% of the general community supported firing Communist clerks or radio 
singers, only 51% of these Community leaders supported such dismissals. Although 
still a majority, this is a marked drop-off, one that becomes even more pronounced 
when it comes to legal restrictions on the rights of Communists. When asked 
whether or not Communists should be put in jail, only 27% of Community leaders, 
compared to the 52% from the general community, stated they should. This data 
suggests that, although the hostilities towards Communism were still relatively wide 
spread in the general community, it was not as pressing a matter for Community 
leaders.  
 What could cause this relative shift? While it is hard to pin point it exactly, 
many scholars have pointed to Eisenhower’s administration as a decisive turning 
 112
point in Cold War relations. 173 He had delivered on his campaign promise to end the 
war in Korea, and now that Stalin was dead, it appeared that diplomatic relations 
rather than military brinkmanship could settle the two nations disputes. Although 
there were still agitations, events like the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution of the Suez 
Crisis in 1956, 174 which would have been impossible in the Truman-Stalin years, 
demonstrated a new sense of diplomacy than had been the norm in earlier years. 
There were still deep and bitter hostilities that laid the groundwork for future 
conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but there was also a sense that the war, 
although still a possibility, wasn’t as inevitable as it appeared before.  
Earl Warren and a New Court 
 
 This change in public attitude was paralleled by an important shift in the 
make-up of the Supreme Court. On September 8th, 1953, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson 
died of a sudden heart attack at the age of 63. The death marked a new era in the 
Supreme Court, and indeed it seemed that some of the justices on the Court knew it: 
it is rumored that Justice Frankfurter responded to the news of Justice Vinson’s 
death by saying “this event was the first solid piece of evidence proving the 
existence of God”.175 While a bit flamboyant, this urban myth seemed prescient now 
because it opened up the Chief Justice seat on the court, and Earl Warren, the man 
who replaced him, went on to oversee one of the most active and energized Courts 
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in the nation’s history. 176 Along with other Eisenhower appointees like Justice 
Brennan and Justice Harlan, Chief Justice Warren’s appointment marked a shift in 
the Court’s composition significantly towards the left in the realm of civil liberties. 
In turn, Chief Justice Warren would preside over some of the most seminal cases in 
the development of modern Constitutional Law, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education, Miranda v. Arizona, and Griswald v. Connecticut. Despite this historic 
legacy, Earl Warren, then the governor of California and one of the most powerful 
politicians in the country, hardly seemed like the natural choice.177 Eisenhower was 
constrained by promises he made to Warren on the campaign trail that he would 
give him the next open Supreme Court seat, and after some deliberating, he finally 
made it official. In light of this reluctant arrival to the bench, Warren, who had never 
served as a justice on a court, 178 took a deferential approach to his first few years on 
the bench. 
 It was not long until the new Court had to decide a case on the censorship of 
domestic communism. Despite his decidedly bold step to form a unanimous 
majority in favor of the Brown decision in 1954, Warren joined the majority Galvan 
v. Press, which upheld the deportation of a Mexican immigrant who was a member 
of the CPUSA from 1954 to 1956. 179 In the decision, the Court maintained the 
limited approach towards constitutional protections against Communist Speech, 
deferring to Congressional evidence that “the communist Movement…is a 
worldwide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is….to establish a Communist 
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totalitarian dictatorship.”180 As the newly minted Chief Justice began to make sense 
of where he stood ideologically and pragmatically, however, he quickly identified 
with the more liberal wing of the Court long-represented by Justices Black and 
Douglas. 181 This change could be recognized outside the Court, as Warren did a 
college lecture tour in the summer of 1954 where he repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of tolerating dissent, suggesting his openness to changes in the nation’s 
jurisprudence. 182 As he stated in an interview for Fortune magazine, “in the present 
struggle between our world and Communism, the temptation to imitate totalitarian 
security methods is a subtle temptation that must be resisted every day”183. As this 
statement made clear, Warren returned to the Court in 1955 with a clear focus on 
limiting what he saw as excessive restrictions on individual rights. 
 The first indication of Warren’s change, and its influence on the Court, was 
the expansion of 5th amendment protections to convicted Communists.  In Slochower 
v. Board of Education of New York City in 1956, the Court ruled that a New York law 
punishing an individual for invoking their 5th amendment right against self-
incrimination instead of answering questions was unconstitutional. As Justice Clark 
explained, “the privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow 
mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt of 
a conclusive presumption of perjury” This relieved a major burden on the part of 
Communists facing trials under various anti-communist laws, as beforehand 
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pleading the 5th amendment was tantamount to a confession of membership in the 
highest ranks of the CPUSA. 184  
 The Warren Court continued to expand protections against anti-communist 
laws with the decision in Cole v. Young deemed the firing of a Food and Drug 
Inspectors for being CPUSA members unconstitutional. In the majority decision, 
Justice Clark writes that because there was no legitimate connection between the 
work of the FDA inspector and national security, there was no grounds for the firing. 
In doing so, this decision made a clear distinction: Communism, although a clear 
threat, was not so existential a concern that anybody who supported it had to be 
rooted out from the American government. While not a decisive rejection of the 
precedent established by Douds, it did place the decision with certain parameters. 
Chief Justice Warren’s ability to effectively form coalitions between the liberal 
minded and moderate members of the court allowed him to be more assertive in 
developing the general thrust of the court and more effectively form majority voting 
blocs.185 Subsequently, Warren quickly became the target of attacks from Senator 
McCarthy himself, who formed a political union with various Conservative Southern 
politicians hoping to remove Warren form the court following the Brown 
decision.186 Despite these attacks, and the growing scorn of Eisenhower and other 
Republican politicians, the Court continued to strike down government anti-
communist laws, going as far as to rule in Pennsylvania v. Nelson that state anti-
sedition laws were unconstitutional because they were superseded by Federal laws. 
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Although this did not alter the letter of the law, it did deny the FBI access to the wide 
network of local and state law enforcement agencies it had developed, a clear 
message from the Warren Court that anti-Communist measures were not going to 
receive a rubber stamp from his court like they did from the Vinson court.187 
Between this decision and their demand for a re-trial in Mesarosh v. United States on 
the grounds that FBI paid informers were suspected of lying, the Warren Court, as 
Senator McCarthy stated in a Senate Internal Security Meeting, “seems to be issuing 
one pro-Communist decision after another”.  
The Warren Court and America’s Moral High Ground 
 
 Before moving on to the Warren Court’s challenges with the Dennis decision, 
it is important to understand the impact of Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. Although highly controversial at home, it was immediately hailed abroad 
as a major victory for American equality: an hour after the decision was released, 
the Voice of America, an international radio station designed to spread American 
programming and propaganda abroad, was reciting the ruling in 34 languages 
around the world.188 The Soviet Union had long criticized the U.S.’s ongoing racial 
inequality in an attempt to demonstrate the U.S.’s moral inferiority to Soviet 
Communism.189 The Brown decision gave the United States evidence that they were 
beginning to move past these inequalities, thereby refuting a main claim of the 
nation’s critics. This desire to silence these critics was part of a larger notion of the 
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moral image of the United States as an integral part of winning the Cold War. A 
dominant argument in the early 1950’s, increasingly left wing publications like The 
Nation190 and New Republic191 began criticizing American anti-communist measures 
along these lines. In their eyes, the flamboyant and overreaching actions of Senator 
McCarthy had damaged the legitimacy of America’s anti-communist movement, and 
even staunch allies like Britain began to take issue with America’s domestic 
subversion laws.192 In Western European countries, Communist parties, though 
generally small, were not as censored as their American counterparts due to larger 
bases of support, and the domestic governments were hesitant to support American 
policies that their constituents saw as draconian. With the Brown decision, the 
Warren Court seemed like the type of influential yet independent institution that 
could re-do America’s anti-communist image. When the Court agreed to hear 
appeals on Yates v. United States in 1956, which concerned the arrests of 14 lower 
level CPUSA officials under the Smith Act, anti-Communist stalwarts like FBI 
director J. Edgar Hoover knew that the Court may well challenge the Dennis 
precedent.193 On June 17th, 1957, “Red Monday”, Hoover’s fears were realized as the 
Supreme Court released a decision that permanently changed the nature of dissent 
in American jurisprudence. 
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The Marketplace Expands 
 
Yates v. United States 
 
 Amongst four Supreme Court rulings released on Red Monday overturning 
various anti-Communist verdicts, the Yates decision actually never deems the Smith 
Act unconstitutional. Instead, the opinion, written by Justice Harlan III, affirms the 
law’s constitutionality, as originally written, in accordance with the nations right to 
self-preservation. They do, however, alter the parameters of the clear and present 
danger test as established by the Dennis decision, thereby altering who may or may 
not be prosecuted under the Act. The key to this change is the Court’s emphasis on a 
clear distinction between advocacy and incitement, directly citing Justice Brandeis’ 
decision in Gitlow. Whereas the Vinson Court determined that, in light of world 
events, supporting Communist principles of revolution constituted a clear and 
present danger, the Warren Court held that only when individuals directly organize 
actions to accomplish this revolutionary goal. 
 Split into three sections, the decision first deals with the “organization” 
aspect of the Smith Act. The Court ultimately determined that the CPUSA, which was 
founded in 1945, could not be prosecuted under this part of the law as it was passed 
in the form of an amendment 6 years later in 1951. Secondly, the Court sought to 
examine the type of instructions the Jury received, and ultimately ruled that, unlike 
in Dennis, they were not appropriately informed that the statute was directed 
towards incitement of action, not mere advocacy. As Justice Harlan explains, “it is 
not the abstract doctrine of overthrowing organized government by unlawful means 
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which is denounced by the statute, but the advocacy of action for the 
accomplishment of that purpose” Without this, the trials were biased from the start 
and had to be thrown out. It was the third section, however, that had the most 
bearings on Smith Act’s application to domestic Communism because it directly 
dealt with the type of evidence used in these cases.194  As Justice Harlan explained, 
of the 14 convicted defendants, 5 of them would have no retrial, as there was no 
evidence beyond their Party membership to suggest that they partook in plans to 
incite action. Upon further analysis, the Court found that “instances of speech that 
could be considered to amount to ‘advocacy of action’ are so few and far between as 
to be almost completely overshadowed by the hundreds of instances in the record in 
which overthrow, if mentioned at all, occurs in the course of doctrinal disputation so 
remote from action as to be almost wholly lacking in probative value”. In doing this, 
the Court made it clear that membership in the Communist Party alone doesn’t 
establish one’s intent to incite revolution. This fundamentally undermined the 
entire framework of Smith Act anti-communist trials because instead of relying on 
the presentation of Communist philosophical texts that suggested a need for 
revolution, the FBI was now required to directly link the prosecuted individuals to 
some type of illegal action. By emphasizing the distinction between advocacy of 
action and incitement of action, the Court re-established the boundaries of the clear 
and present danger test delineated in the time before the Red Scare.  
 This emphasis on incitement rather than advocacy demonstrates the Court’s 
view that dissent, far from an active threat, is a vital part of the political process that 
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must be protected. As Justice Black explains in his concurring opinion, “unless there 
is complete freedom for expression of all ideas, where we like them or not, 
concerning the way government should be run and who shall run it, I doubt if any 
views, in the long run, can be secured against the censor.” This is a clear reference to 
the Marketplace of Ideas, but as suggested by the call for “complete freedom for 
expression of all ideas” this Marketplace is meant to be free of ideological 
boundaries. This change can be seen by the fact that the Warren Court, unlike the 
Vinson Court in Dennis, never really partakes in a comprehensive analysis of the 
implications of Communist ideology. It does not matter if they are a foreign aligned 
organization whose ultimate goal is the complete recreation of American 
government and society through whatever means necessary: all that matters is 
whether or not they are actively working to promote illegal activity. This new 
Marketplace is meant to be one where no matter how repugnant, unpopular, or even 
openly hostile, a political ideology is, only active preparation for illegal action 
permits proponents of that ideology to be censored. This is further demonstrated by 
the fact that Justice Black’s concern over the Marketplace of Ideas is based on a fear 
that such restrictions would make no ideology safe from censorship rather than 
establishing a precedent that would hamper the development of better policies. In 
doing so, this language embraces the Marketplace of Ideas in a more expansive way 
than previously envisioned by going beyond justifying the utility of Free Speech 
alone. Instead, it presents Free Speech as a principle inherent in free government 
that all citizens are entitled to practice. In other words, it merges the utility-driven 
nature of the original Marketplace envisioned by Justice Holmes in Schenck with a 
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more participatory perspective on speech as advocated for by the Democratic Self-
Governance school of thought. 
  In doing so, Justice Black demonstrates decidedly the full impact of this 
decision. The distinction between advocacy and incitement in the clear and present 
danger test, more than anything, is designed to allow individuals as much room as 
possible in presenting ideas that are seen by many to be completely contrary to 
what American government is and should be. This expanded breathing room allows 
the individual to actively become a part of the Democratic process, thereby 
establishing a new level of importance of the participation and tolerance of political 
dissidents. The political ideologies of any citizen, even if they are sympathetic to 
foreign powers or abstractly support active, violent revolution, are permitted into 
the Marketplace of Ideas. In this light, the Yates decision, though based on a return 
to the distinction between advocacy and incitement established by Justice Brandeis, 
redefines the identity of a legitimate citizen in the Democratic process. After a 
decade of Cold War repression, the Court determined that offensive ideas, even ones 
connected existential and geopolitical threat of Communism, did not remove an 
individual from the larger Democratic process. The idea of an “un-American” 
political ideology, which had fueled the debate on political censorship since the 
beginning of the nation, was rendered legally impossible.  
Impact of Yates 
A Stalinist Party in a Post-Stalinists World  
 
 Despite the jurisprudential change following Yates, there was no new era of 
prosperity and political re-awakening for the CPUSA and American Communism. 
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Instead, the party slowly drifted further and further into obscurity. Although, as 
Eugene Dennis put it, the Party was working to “surmount losses sustained during 
the cold-war decade [and] to overcome our relative isolation”195, the damage was 
already done. Despite the fact that the Communist Party was now free of the Smith 
Act trials that had plagued its members since the Dennis decision, it was still viewed 
with general condemnation by the end of the decade.196 The détente may have 
cooled off relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S., but that did not mean 
they were reset to World War II levels of cooperation. In this frigid atmosphere, the 
CPUSA found that the American public still had little appetite for Communist 
domestic policies. The Court had given them access to the Marketplace of Ideas, but 
that didn’t mean the Marketplace would embrace them.  
 Furthermore, the Party’s membership was decimated by the internal 
ideological and loyalty-based purges of the Red Scare years. From a high of over 
100,000 at the end of World War II, the party barely number 10,000 by 1958, more 
than 1,500 of whom were FBI informants.197 This decrease was not only due to the 
removal of high-ranking officials, but also the general emphasis on conformity to the 
party doctrine led many members to condemn the CPUSA as stagnant and 
ineffective.198 As the editor-in-chief of the Daily Worker said when explaining his 
resignation form the party, “I have come to the reluctant conclusion that the party 
cannot be changed from within and that the fight to do so is hopeless”199 In light of 
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the Khrushchev’s revelations on Stalin’s inhumane tactics, high ranking members of 
the party’s inner circle increasingly began to remove themselves from the party. 
This demonstrates the way the geopolitical connection to the Soviet Union that had 
defined the CPUSA since its creation, and fueled much of the anti-Communist efforts 
of the era, ultimately undid the Party. By making themselves a branch of the U.S.S.R., 
and stern supporters of Stalinism, they attached themselves to a platform they 
ultimately in fact did not support. The CPUSA realized this and attempted to 
emphasize creating a new, more independent party that would be able to adapt its 
message to the needs of the American working class. 200.The problem was that, as 
membership continued to dwindle as the decade went on, hard liners in the Party 
like Secretary Foster insisted on maintaining connections to the Communist 
International, and their prolonged debates eventually succeeded in convincing 
reformers the futility of their efforts. 201 Denied the ability to create a new, U.S.-
oriented Communist Party, the post-Stalin CPUSA quickly became a marginalized 
group of pro-Stalinist ideologues. By embracing the platform of foreign powers, the 
CPUSA guaranteed it would never be able to develop a lasting American identity and 
the political footmark such a change may have offered. 
The Birth of a New American Citizen 
 
 Despite the failure of the CPUSA to fully integrate itself into the American 
political system following Red Monday, the Yates decision marked the beginning of a 
redefinition in what it meant to be a citizen in the United States. In defending the 
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CPUSA’s right to protected speech, an organization explicitly connected to America’s 
greatest political rival that theoretically supported a domestic revolution, the Court 
expanded the openness of the Marketplace of Ideas beyond where even Justice 
Brandeis and Holmes envisioned. Whereas Abrams and Gitlow and similar cases 
supporting the Marketplace of Ideas in the 1920’s and 30’s were based on 
protecting the rights of Communists in times of peace, Yates affirmed that even in 
the Cold War environment of paranoia and constant threats, political speech had to 
be protected. In this way, citizenship was no longer connected to loyalty to, or even 
support for, the United States and what it stands for. It was now based on the notion 
that a Democratic government cannot be truly democratic unless its citizens are 
able to express whatever ideology best represents them.  
 The fact that this decision was made in an environment greatly concerned 
with security threats is in fact a large part of Yates’ impact. As explained earlier, 
American political history has been marked by moments of pathological repression 
of unpopular ideas. 202 These tactics are even more pronounced in times of war, as 
can be seen by the Lincoln Administration’s denial of habeas corpus to accuse 
Confederate supporters, the World War I era Espionage and Sedition Acts, and the 
Court’s decision to support Japanese Internment Camps in Korematsu v. United 
States. Although the Cold War was not an active war by definition, the language of 
repression towards Domestic Communism was largely couched in terms of national 
security based on the CPUSA’s connection to the Soviet Union.  They were seen as 
enemy combatants and enemy sympathizers, and America followed this pattern of 
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domestic suppression based on these fears.  Although the easing of tensions leading 
up to the Yates decision made war seem less imminent, the Cold War environment 
of constant tension still made conflict a possibility. The fact that the Court accepted 
the existence of such an environment and still upheld the speech rights of domestic 
Communists based demonstrates a break in the cycle of reflexive repression of 
enemy sympathizers and supporters in times of ideological and military conflict. In 
doing so, the Court created the jurisprudential precedent that even those individuals 
who, abstractly, advocate the removal of the existing U.S. government by 
revolutionary and military means are citizens who have unhampered access to the 
Marketplace of Ideas. 
 As with all things, this change wasn’t immediate. In the years following the 
Yates decision, the Court seemed at times to be returning to its Red Scare policy of 
blurring the lines between advocacy and incitement. A prime example of this is the 
decision in Scales v. United States in 1960 to uphold the conviction of Junius Scales 
under the Smith Act for membership in the CPUSA. A year later, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act’s prohibition on membership in organizations 
recognized as subversive in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive 
Activities Control Board. This backtracking rested on the Warren Court’s difficulty in 
establishing a clear line between advocacy of abstract action, which more liberal 
justices wanted to protect, and direct action, which had generally been accepted as 
constitutionally punishable. Ultimately, this debate culminated in transformational 
changes in Free Speech doctrine: the replacement of the clear and present danger 
test with the imminent lawless action test. 
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 The imminent lawless action test requires censorship of speech to be based 
on whether the speech in question is designed to incite or produce imminent 
lawless action and whether or not it is likely to produce such action. This standard, 
established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, decidedly favors a more accessible approach to 
Free Speech by requiring the prosecution to find direct links between censored 
speech and illegal action. Arguments for censorship based on the possible societal 
effects of that speech, the backbone of the Dennis decision, were decidedly rejected. 
In doing so, this new standard laid the foundation for a modern doctrine that, as 
detractors have often noted, has protected ideological minorities like racial hate 
groups. 203 This insistence on focusing on planning of action is a clear extension of 
the Yates decision’s emphasis on direct incitement. The Court directly brought up 
this relationship by noting the importance of the Yates decision in rejecting 
advocacy as a reasonable cause for political censorship in the decision’s 
footnotes.204 By re-emphasizing the importance of concrete connections between 
individual’s speech and individual’s illegal actions, Yates thereby laid the 
groundwork for the imminent lawless action test. 
 Inherent in this new test is the Court’s emphasis on content neutrality in 
determining the constitutionality of speech censorship. This approach, which 
permits the need to restrict certain forms of speech based on a variety of situational 
and societal needs, states that “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
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subject matter or its content.” 205 In effect, it has required the court to rigorously 
determine whether or not censorship of politicized forms of speech are based on a 
desire to diminish the saliency of that idea or a more reasonable time, place, or 
manner restriction, such as prohibitions on fighting words, obscenity, and the 
maintenance of effective school environments.206 In doing so, this concept gives 
doctrinal protection for the pursuit of a more expansive, participatory Marketplace 
of Ideas as advocated in the Yates decision.  This can be demonstrated by the 
decision in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, in which the court 
overruled a law preventing an individual from picketing outside a school that is not 
a labor-based protest. As Justice Marshall explained, “to permit the continued 
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, 
our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free form government 
censorship.” Not only does this quote clearly harken to the Marketplace of Idea’s 
emphasis on progress through discourse, but it also emphasizes the importance of 
individual self-development through collective action.  
 This demonstrates a fusion of the Democratic Self-Governance model of 
speech with the Marketplace of Ideas in a manner designed to present individual 
self-development and national progress as a united goal. By creating a system that 
allowed all individuals, regardless of ideological views, the court’s emphasis on 
content neutrality created a jurisprudence wherein  “all speech claimants must be 
granted a hearing, regardless of the nature of their views, because each ahs equal 
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status in the eyes of the law.”207 This provides a new idea of what a citizen is. Not a 
follower of specific ideals or an adherent to shared guiding principles, but an 
individual who ventures into the tumultuous Marketplace of Ideas and tries to inject 
whichever ideologies they deem worthy. In doing so, the Court has developed a 
framework that has expanded the very notion of who has access to speech, and who 
can be silenced. 
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Conclusion 
Effect of Censorship on Democratic Identities 
 
 As demonstrated by the increasingly punitive nature of anti-communist 
measures as the Red Scare went on, the American public and representatives alike 
continually disassociated domestic Communists from the rest of the American 
population as a whole. To them, these individuals were not citizens: they were 
foreign agents. This development, however, needs to be qualified, as the connection 
between the CPUSA and the Soviet Union was a unique relationship that is not 
replicated in every instance of state-sanctioned repression. Therefore, it is difficult 
to conclude decisively whether or not censorship of certain ideologies directly leads 
to the development of stratified perceptions of Democratic access on the part of the 
censors. Instead, it would be more reasonable to conclude that individual groups 
that are in one way or another connected to foreign agents, particularly those who 
are hostile to the United States, are more likely to be categorized as outside the 
bounds of Democratic legitimacy due to their dual loyalties. The implications of this 
are clear: if you want to justify censorship, the best way to do so is by connecting the 
desired group to a foreign entity. Alternatively, to avoid censorship, it may be 
effective to actively work towards establishing a clear domestic identity that 
emphasizes the organizations connection to the national community as a whole. 
 The problem, as demonstrated by the gradual collapse of the CPUSA, is that 
in many ways such organizations may have a tendency to renounce their domestic 
connections and further align themselves with foreign powers. In this way, the 
repressive tactics of the United States government did have a destabilizing impact 
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on the democratic identity of the members of the CPUSA as it pushed them further 
and further away from the political system, most notably in the form of their 
connections to the CIO and various state-level apparatuses. Although this 
occasionally led them to try to directly insert themselves into government, as 
demonstrated by the Progressive Party of 1948, or assert their place as rightful 
citizens, as in their challenges to the Dennis decision, by and large these tactics 
succeeded in isolating them outside of the realm of American politics. 
 This de-democratizing nature can also be seen in the purges the CPUSA 
undertook periodically in order to remove any possible opposition to their 
platforms from within the party. Catalyzed by fears of a gradual weakening of the 
party’s ideological core, these purges were precipitated on emphasizing authority 
over dissent: if you criticized the party, you were attacking the party, and if you 
were attacking the party, you had to be removed. This is an unexpected finding as it 
suggests that the CPUSA’s lack of a strong connection to the American political 
system as a result of Red Scare censorship may have ultimately led them to 
denounce Democratic approaches towards organization as a whole. While part of 
this can be explained by Soviet Communism’s emphasis on leadership, the fact that 
these purges increased dramatically as the party was coming under governmental 
attack indicates that there is an explicit connection between this shrinking tolerance 
for internal dissent and government sanctioned censorship. 
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Impact of Yates on Modern Jurisprudence 
 
 As has been demonstrated, the Yates decision laid the groundwork for the 
modern First Amendment protections provided to political speech. By establishing 
that individuals of all ideologies are entitled to voice their opinions, even if they 
were abstractly illegal, the Court merged the utility driven Marketplace of Ideas with 
the individualized Democratic Self-Governance School. In doing so, the Court 
established a precedent wherein the notion of who constitutes a legitimate citizen 
has been expanded to preclude any ideological requirements. No matter how 
potentially egregious or foreign certain ideas may seem or how much possible 
societal damage may be established due to the ideological effects, citizens of the 
United States are citizens of the United States. The Court saw what happened when 
abstract possibilities are given weight in determining the impact of unpopular 
speech, and they decided to ultimately renounce such justifications in favor of the 
more stringent imminent lawless action test.  
 This realization is essential because it rationalizes the Court’s staunch 
commitment to content neutrality in determining the constitutional legitimacy of 
state-sanctioned censorship. By looking to Yates and other anti-communists 
decisions as the basis of modern content-neutral approaches rather than the 
decisions of the late 1960’s and 70’s, such as Brandenburg v. Ohio and National 
Socialist Party of Ameirca v. Village of Skokie, it is clear that the legacy of the Red 
Scare’s broad-based assault on Communist ideologies has rendered the Court 
hesitant to permit any form of political censorship. To do so would invite the type of 
democratic stratification that became law in this era.  
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 The importance of this development cannot be understated. Although 
sometimes it may disgust us, forcing us to hear content and ideas that make our skin 
crawl and seem to poison the air around us with ignorance and evil, this framework 
has laid the building blocks for a society based on active engagement with ideas and 
acceptance of alternate opinions, at least as a reasonable perspective. It is in this 
capacity to create a society more open to intriguing and at times frightening 
opinions that many scholars have pointed to as the true effect of modern Free 
Speech Jurisprudence.208 From this perspective, the virtue of expanding speech 
protection to all individuals, regardless of ideology, and welcoming them to the 
Marketplace of Ideas as equal citizens under the law instills in individuals a sense 
that there is no uniform doctrinaire approach towards life, but instead that different 
groups and different people will see the world differently. Sometimes that difference 
will amaze us, and some times that difference will frighten us, call into question our 
very notions of morality and who we are as a society. It may be tempting to succumb 
this repulsion and use it to justify a categorical rejection of what the opposition is 
saying, but as John Stuart Mills said nearly 200 years ago, “the price paid for this 
sort of intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the 
human mind.”209 The Court, by protecting the speech rights, and citizenship, of all 
ideologies, has worked to create a society based on such moral courage. Ideas, and 
the people who hold them, aren’t to be categorically discarded, but welcomed to the 
ongoing debate and given an opportunity to make their aspirations a reality. We are 
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free to challenge them, but it is their inalienable right to challenge us too. Only by 
doing so, rather than silencing them out of hand, can we grow as knowers of the 
world around us. Furthermore, in creating such a system, the Supreme Court has 
recognized the inalienable freedom of each individual to express themselves for all 
the world to see. The American Marketplace of Ideas, while not perfect, is more 
open than ever before, and it is in large due to the clashes over the civil liberties of 
American Communists in the 1950’s. 
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